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BANK DIRECTOR LIABILITY UNDER FIRREA
MICHAEL P. BATTIN*
The court, of course, is greatly troubled with the callous disregard of
law, fiduciary duties, and the interests of depositors shown by direc-
tors and officers of countless banks and savings and loans. Like
FDIC and taxpayers everywhere, the court would like to see these
individuals made to pay for their errors and forced to reimburse the
public fisc. Justice and equity demand no less.'
INTRODUCTION
By 1989, a nationwide series of bank2 failures had provided cata-
strophic evidence of the need for legislative reform of the nation's
bank regulatory system. A deluge of insolvencies forced the federal
government to confront tens of billions of dollars in claims from de-
positors whose savings had been insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation. To instill some semblance of order and to limit the
calls on the federal treasury, Congress enacted the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").3 Presi-
dent Bush signed FIRREA into law on August 9, 1989, thereby
enacting a "comprehensive and wide-ranging set of proposals"4 for
thorough realignment of the regulatory system.5
Because many of the bank failures were due, in whole or in part, to
either outright fraud or negligent mismanagement' by bank directors,7
* I wish to thank Dr. Michael Malloy for his guidance and encouragement dur-
ing the preparation of this Note.
1. Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
2. For simplicity, in this Note "bank" refers to all federally insured depository
institutions unless otherwise specified. The term "depository institution" was defined
in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, Mar. 31, 1980, 94 Stat. 132 (1980), as including:
any commercial bank the deposits of which are federally insured or are eligi-
ble for federal insurance; any mutual savings bank that is federally insured
or eligible for insurance; any stock savings bank that is federally insured or
eligible for insurance; any credit union that is insured or eligible for insur-
ance; any member of the Federal Home Loan Bank System; and any savings
association (such as [Savings and Loans, or "S&Ls"], savings banks, and the
like) that is insured or eligible for insurance.
1 Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation 1.6-1.7 (1994). On the meaning of
these terms, see id. at 1.4-1.25; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a-g) (Supp. V 1993) (defining
bank, savings association, depository institution, member banks, mutual savings bank,
and savings bank).
3. RTC v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
4. President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1989, at D8.
5. 1 Malloy, supra note 2, at 1.115-1.118.
6. Most of the negligence or gross negligence claims brought against bank direc-
tors were based on decisions to make specific loans. Loans that proved disastrous
"for the development of real estate or new businesses, loans that sometimes failed
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FIRREA was intended, among other things, "to strengthen the civil
sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging
depository institutions and their depositors"8 and to "strengthen the
enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions. "9
FIRREA sought, in other words, "to maximize the federal govern-
ment's ability to recover from individuals who have caused banks to
fail or lose substantial sums of money." 10 To effectuate these pur-
poses, Congress for the first time legislated on the standard of liability
applicable to directors of federally insured banks.1 The result of this
Congressional foray was section 214(n), codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(k). In the words of President Bush, § 1821(k) was enacted to
enable the FDIC to "seek out and punish those that have committed
wrongdoing in the management of these failed institutions.""2 Section
1821(k) reads as follows:
(k) Liability of directors and officers
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be
held personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by,
on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the [FDIC, or "Corpo-
ration"], which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the bene-
fit of the Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action
purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such re-
ceiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action
purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in
part by an insured depository institution or its affiliate in connection
with assistance provided under section 1823 of this title, for gross
negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demon-
strates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence)
including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined
and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this para-
before a single payment was made, loans that were extended or 'rolled over' two or
three times, often with accrued interest being added to the principle, and so forth."
Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Partnerships
755 (5th ed. 1994).
7. For simplicity, in this Note "directors" refers to both directors and officers of
depository institutions unless otherwise specified. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(1) (Supp.
V 1993) (including in the definition of "Institution-affiliated party," "any director,
officer, employee, or controlling stockholder (other than a bank holding company) of,
or agent for, an insured depository institution").
8. FDIC v. Burrell, 779 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
9. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 101(9), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note(Supp. V 1993)) (purposes of 1989 amendment).
10. FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 & n.21 (M.D. La. 1992).
11. RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
12. President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. Tunes, Feb.
7, 1989, at D8.
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graph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other
applicable law.1
3
Section 1821(k) allows the FDIC or the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion14 to hold directors or officers of federally insured depository insti-
tutions personally liable "for gross negligence, including any similar
conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of
care."' 5 Thus it is clear that § 1821(k) preempts state laws prohibiting
the FDIC from suing officers and directors for gross negligence or
other more egregious conduct. 16 Due, however, to the ambiguous lan-
guage of § 1821(k), especially the last sentence, or "savings clause,"' 7
courts have not been able to agree on a number of other issues. First,
courts have not been able to reach a consensus on whether § 1821(k)
preempts state laws holding bank directors to a more stringent-sim-
pie negligence-standard of liability.'" Second, courts are divided as
to whether § 1821(k) preempts the federal common law of bank direc-
tor liability. 9 Further, the courts holding that § 1821(k) does not pre-
empt federal common law disagree on the standard of liability for
bank directors under federal common law.2° Finally, courts differ as
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). Section 1821 of Title 12
addresses the powers and duties of the FDIC as conservator and receiver. Pursuant
to 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A), the RTC possesses the same powers and duties as the
FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
14. For simplicity, in this Note "FDIC" refers to both the FDIC and the RTC.
15. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
16. FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 995 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1993); see also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. CL 2048, 2054 (1994)
("1821(k) . . . permit[s] claims against directors and officers for gross negligence, re-
gardless of whether state law would require greater culpability."); Norwood P. Bever-
idge, Jr., Director Liability Under FIRREA: Negligence and Gross Negligence in the
Courts, 48 Consumer Fm. L.Q. Rep. 77,79 (1994) ("At the present time, all courts are
agreed that FIRREA was intended to preempt state laws that would hold directors to
a standard of liability lower than gross negligence."). The practical effect is that the
statute invalidates state "insulating statutes," which allow corporations to include in
their articles of incorporation provisions shielding directors from personal liability.
See Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 2.02(b)(4) (1994).
17. The last sentence of section 1821(k) reads: "Nothing in this paragraph shall
impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." 12. U.S.C.
§ 1821(k).
18. Compare RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1275
(N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding that § 1821(k) "does pre-empt RTC's state-law [simple neg-
ligence] claims") with FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that "state law claims premised on lesser culpability [than the gross negligence stan-
dard in section 1821(k)] are not preempted by FIRREA"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2440 (1993).
19. Compare RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
"federal common law in this area is preempted" by § 1821(k)) with RTC v. Gibson,
829 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (holding that § 1821(k) "does not preempt
federal common law").
20. Compare FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (accepting
without question that "the federal common law standard... is simple negligence")
with FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (citing
with approval "two district courts [that] have expressly decided that a cause of action
19951 2349
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to whether federally chartered banks may be sued under state direc-
tor-liability law2 and as to whether state-chartered banks may be
sued under federal common law.22
Given the numerous disparities among judicial interpretations of
§ 1821(k), it is obvious that a reinterpretation or reformulation of that
statute is necessary. Part I of this Note delineates the differing ap-
proaches to § 1821(k) and concludes that the language of the statute is
susceptible to two diametrically opposed, yet equally valid, interpreta-
tions with regard to each of the above detailed issues.23 Part II sug-
gests that because § 1821(k) is open to several conflicting
interpretations, courts should accept the ambiguity of the "plain lan-
guage" and the legislative history of the statute and address the real
question of what public policy § 1821(k) should advance. FIRREA
was not enacted in a vacuum, however, and analysis of the policy is-
sues surrounding § 1821(k) therefore necessarily includes an examina-
tion into the public policy concerns surrounding the origination of
bank regulation in this country-specifically the creation of the de-
posit insurance system.
Part III of this Note applies the public policy rationale behind the
creation of federal deposit insurance to § 1821(k), concluding that the
aims of the insurance system-security of small deposits, stability of
the banking system, and protection of the deposit insurance fund2 4-
dictate that bank directors should be subject to a simple negligence
for negligence against the directors and officers of federally insured banks does not
fall within the province of federal common law").
21. Compare RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. at 1109 n.2 ("There is nothing to sug-
gest that officers ... of federally chartered institutions are only subject to federal
causes of action.") with RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Utah 1993) ("fed-
eral law exclusively governs the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associa-
tions, including director liability").
22. Although few courts dealing with § 1821(k) have addressed this issue, at least
one court has held that "federal common law should not be applied to state chartered,
federally-insured associations." Hess, 820 F. Supp. at 1370.
23. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.) (en banc) ("Canfield III"), cert.
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992) (noting that "Congress' choice of language in 12
U.S.C. § 1821(k) is susceptible to two valid yet opposing interpretations").
24. "The deposit insurance fund is the net worth of the FDIC, and represents ac-
cumulated earnings retained since 1933." Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The First Fifty Years: A History of the
FDIC 1933-1983, at 66 (1984) [hereinafter History of the FDIC]. "The primary statu-
tory mandate of the FDIC has been to provide deposit insurance to all banks qualify-
ing for insurance ... In this regard .... it is the responsibility of the FDIC to pay off
depositors of insured banks that are closed without sufficient assets to satisfy claims of
depositors ... ." Malloy, supra note 2, at 1.66-1.67. The FDIC satisfies these claims
out of the insurance fund. FIRREA, in addition to § 1821(k), also gave the FDIC
"responsibility for insurance of deposits of savings associations. It will now adminis-
ter a Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), formerly the Permanent Insurance Fund with re-
spect to deposits of insured banks, and a Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF),
replacing the functions of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC)." Id. at 1.68-1.70; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a) (Supp. V 1993) (continuing
insurance for insured depository institutions and savings associations formerly coy-
2350 [Vol. 63
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standard. By limiting the standard under which the FDIC can bring
suit to gross negligence and leaving other issues unresolved, Congress
not only divided the federal judiciary, but also relieved bank directors
of the costs of their simple negligence and forced the insurance fund
to bear the cost of that negligence. Because the federal taxpayer must
ultimately shoulder the financial burden if the insurance fund's ex-
penses exceed its earnings, the gross negligence standard is inade-
quate. Nevertheless, until Congress decides to redraft § 1821(k),
federal courts must decide whether to allow the FDIC to bring claims
against bank directors-under state law or federal common law-
based on simple negligence. This Note concludes that courts should
acknowledge the public policy issues underlying FIRREA and permit
the FDIC to bring claims against bank directors for simple negligence.
I. SEcriON 1821(K): JUDICL INTERPRETATION
Courts have been divided on a number of issues surrounding the
interpretation of § 1821(k).25 The focus by some courts on the "plain
language" and legislative history of the statute is misplaced, however,
because § 1821(k) is ultimately ambiguous and open to several rea-
sonable interpretations. Any analysis of § 1821(k) must therefore
center on the public policy behind the deposit insurance system, the
FDIC, and § 1821(k).
A. Preemption Of State Law
The first issue brought before the courts was whether § 1821(k)
preempts state law claims based on simple negligence. 6 The district
court for the District of Utah first addressed this question in FDIC v.
Canfield ("Canfield r,).27 The Canfield I court held that § 1821(k)
fully preempts state law, and, therefore, the FDIC could not bring suit
based on a state law claim of simple negligence. The Tenth Circuit,
ered by FSLIC insurance). For simplicity, in this Note "insurance fund" will refer
collectively to both the BIF and the SAIF unless otherwise specified.
25. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
26. Simple negligence is defined as the "failure to exercise for protection of others
that degree of care and caution that would, under prevailing circumstances, be exer-
cised by ordinarily prudent person." Black's Law Dictionary 1383 (6th ed. 1990).
Gross negligence is defined as the "intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another." Id.
at 1033. It is clear that a claim based on simple negligence would allow a jury to find
for a plaintiff on a lesser showing than is required for a claim based on gross
negligence.
27. FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991) ("Canfield I"), rev'd en
banc, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992). Another court
dealt with § 1821(k) in dicta, but did not directly address the preemption issue. See
Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1990), modified on reh'g, 933 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.
1991).
1995] 2351
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however, reversed the district court.' In fact, only a minority of the
courts subsequently addressing the issue have followed Canfield I and
held that § 1821(k) fully preempts state law.29 A majority of courts
addressing § 1821(k) have held that the statute only partially
preempts state law. In other words, FIRREA does not preempt state
law claims premised on simple negligence. Despite the numerical dis-
tribution of the courts, however, courts holding that § 1821(k) fully
preempts state law make arguments as plausible and cogent as those
made by courts holding that the statute only partially preempts state
law.
1. Full Preemption-The Minority View30
The Canfield I court was faced with the question of whether
§ 1821(k) preempted Utah director liability law permitting the FDIC
to bring actions against bank directors for conduct amounting to less
than gross negligence.3 ' In Canfield I, the FDIC brought suit against
former directors and officers of Tracey Collins Bank & Trust Com-
pany, seeking damages for imprudent loans made or approved by the
defendants, for waste of bank assets, and for mismanagement. 31 The
FDIC's claims were based on simple negligence.33
The Canfield I court held that § 1821(k) preempts state law claims
based on simple negligence. 34 Like most others subsequently dealing
with § 1821(k), the Canfield I court analyzed the statute from three
different perspectives: (1) the "plain language" of the statute; (2) the
legislative history; and (3) public policy.
28. Canfield III, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct.
516 (1992) (because the lower court's reasoning has been adopted by many of the
other minority courts, and because it remains the best explication of the full preemp-
tion position, I will refer to the district court's opinion throughout this Note).
29. FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 537 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The lower courts
are split on the question of the FDIC's ability to proceed against officers and directors
for simple negligence under state law. The majority, however, agree with the FDIC
that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law allowing such claims.").
30. See RTC v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[M]ost courts
have concluded that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law simple negligence claims
that would otherwise be permitted against S & L directors."); Cindy A. Schipani,
Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 J. Corp. L. 739, 759 (1993)
(noting that the minority view is "that FIRREA mandates a national standard of
gross negligence").
31. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 534.
32. Id.
33. Id at 535.
34. Id at 540.
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a. "Plain Language"
Beginning its analysis with the "plain language" of the statute,3 the
Canfield I court noted that the first sentence of § 1821(k), standing
alone, "expressly defines the parameters of liability for officers and
directors where the FDIC is acting as a successor in interest to the
claims of a depository institution. It carefully sets the standard [at
gross negligence]." 36
The first sentence does not, however, stand alone, and the court
next focused on the last sentence of § 1821(k), which reads: "Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation
under other applicable law."37 The court reasoned that reading the
last sentence of § 1821(k) as only a partial preemption of state law-
leaving intact state statutory or common law causes of action against
bank directors for simple negligence-would defeat Congressional in-
tent to create a uniform national standard:
This interpretation results in a chaotic situation where the liability
of directors and officers of federal depository institutions is gov-
erned not by a uniform federal standard, as surely was intended by
this sweeping federal legislation governing the issue, but by varying
state standards which leave liability and exposure mostly dependent
on state of residence.?8
To avoid this result, the Canfield I court concluded, in a series of infer-
ences, that "other applicable law" in the final sentence of § 1821(k)
refers not to state law but to other provisions in FIRREA.39
First, the court found it significant that other provisions of FIR-
REA-including § 1821(k)-explicitly refer to "state law" when such
reference is intended.4° Therefore, if Congress intended "other appli-
cable law" to mean "applicable state law," Congress would have made
explicit reference to state law, as it did at the close of the first sentence
of § 1821(k).4' In light of the conspicuous absence of any reference to
state law in the savings clause, the Canfield I court found that constru-
35. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)
("The starting point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute it-
self." (quoting Consumer Products Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980))); Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
36. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 536.
37. 12 U.S.C. 1821(k).
38. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 536.
39. Id at 536-37.
40. Id at 536.
41. Id at 536-37; see also FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (D. Minn.
1991) (finding that if "Congress [had] intended 'other applicable law' to mean 'appli-
cable state law,' Congress would have used those precise words just as it did at the
close of the immediately preceding sentence"). Section 1821(k) allows the FDIC to
brings suit against directors "for gross negligence, including any similar conduct... as
such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)
(Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
195] 2353
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ing the phrase "other applicable law" to include state law permitting
suits against directors for simple negligence would render the explicit
gross negligence standard "facially meaningless. '4
Second, the court analyzed the use of the word "impair" in
§ 1821(k). The final sentence of § 1821(k) states that "[n]othing in
this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation
under other applicable law."'43 According to Canfield 1, the sentence
has no meaning unless there is some other non-applicable law under
which the rights of the FDIC are impaired. The court reasoned that
Congress intended that § 1821(k)-"this paragraph"-would not im-
pair the FDIC's rights under FIRREA-"other applicable law."44
Under the court's reasoning, however, Congress also intended that
§ 1821(k) would impair the FDIC's right to proceed on a less stringent
cause of action, simple negligence, based on state law. Therefore, the
court found that Congress intended that § 1821(k) would impair the
rights of the FDIC by preempting any state law containing a simple
negligence standard of liability for bank directors.
To support its conclusion that the phrase "other applicable law" re-
fers to FIRREA itself, the court noted that the FDIC can, under other
provisions of FIRREA, obtain, inter alia, civil penalties45 and cease-
and-desist orders46 against officers and directors under different stan-
dards of liability than that in § 1821(k). Therefore, the last sentence
of § 1821(k) was meant to "clarify any ambiguity regarding the differ-
ent standards of liability which may apply in varied, but potentially
related, enforcement and regulatory situations. '47 In other words, the
savings clause was meant to preserve the FDIC's ability to take other
regulatory actions based on simple negligence. 48 The court found that
the phrase "other applicable law" was meant to ensure that § 1821(k)
would not be construed to "impair or affect" the rights of the FDIC or
the RTC under other sections of FIRREA.49
b. Legislative History
The Canfield I court next explored § 1821(k)'s "long and confusing"
legislative history.50 First, the court noted that the earliest version of
42. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 536-37.
43. 12 U.S.C. 1821(k).
44. Canfield I, 763 F. Supp. at 536-37.
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(1)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).
47. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 537.
48. Cf. FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e find that the savings
clause preserves the FDIC's ability to take other regulatory actions based on simple
negligence, i.e., to remove directors and to issue cease and desist orders, but does not
preserve federal common law claims.").
49. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 537.
50. Id at 538.
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§ 1821(k) contained a simple negligence standard,5' which was later
amended to reflect the current gross negligence standard. Second, the
court noted that the Conference Committee Report addressed the
amended, gross negligence, version of § 1821(k) as follows:
Title II preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the
FDIC in any capcity [sic] against officers or directors of an insured
depository institution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue
claims for gross negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty of care, including intentional tortious
conduct.52
According to the court, the Conference Report suggests that the
FDIC may not hold bank directors personally liable for conduct
amounting to less than gross negligence "despite state law to the con-
trary. ' - 3 The court conceded, however, that two months after the
Senate passed the amended version of § 1821(k), which did not sup-
port the court's full preemption rationale,
the managers of the bill inserted a section-by-section analysis of the
§ 1821(k) provision into the Congressional Record. That analysis
provides, in part, that § 1821(k) does not prevent the FDIC from
pursuing claims under State law or under other applicable Federal
law, if such law permits the officers and directors of a financial insti-
tution to be sued (1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as
simple negligence, or (2) on an alternative theory such as breach of
contract or breach of fiduciary duty. 4
Because of the confused nature of the legislative proceedings, the
court was unable to glean any clear legislative intention.55 It thus de-
clined to give weight to the legislative history of § 1821(k).56
c. Public Policy
Finally, the court in Canfield I considered § 1821(k) from a policy
perspective. It reasoned that interpreting § 1821(k) to establish a na-
tional standard of gross negligence balances the public interest in at-
tracting qualified people to direct the affairs of banks with the public
interest in holding "these high fiduciaries liable for intentional or
grossly-negligent conduct in the administration of an institution's af-
fairs. '57 According to the court, a reading of § 1821(k) permitting
state law claims based on simple negligence would contravene the
51. Id
52. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 393, 398 (1989), reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 437.
53. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 539.
54. Id at 538.
55. Id. at 539 (finding that the "convoluted and contradictory nature of the pro-
ceedings culminating in the codification of § 1821(k) renders it impossible for the
court to discover any meaningful legislative opinion about its purpose or impact").
56. Id at 538.
57. Id. at 539.
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long recognized need to attract bright and ambitious leaders to serve
as directors. Under a partial preemption interpretation, the personal
risk is just too great, and "honest, responsible persons with assets to
protect" would be driven from banking directorships.58
The Canfield I court also reasoned that reading § 1821(k) to estab-
lish a national gross negligence standard promotes economic effi-
ciency by focusing the FDIC's efforts and the taxpayers' dollars on
truly culpable parties.59 Further, a uniform national standard pro-
motes the public interest because "[u]niformity saves money, time and
manpower" by relieving the FDIC of the monumental and costly task
of maneuvering through each state's common and statutory law re-
garding director liability.60
Accordingly, the Canfield I court concluded that § 1821(k) fully
preempts state law on bank director liability, adding that "[a]ny other
interpretation results in little improvement over pre-FIRREA condi-
tions and is inconsistent with the national goals addressed by Congress
in the enactment of FIRREA, and particularly § 1821(k). '61
The court in RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer,62 also
finding that § 1821(k) fully preempts state law, added yet another pol-
icy consideration to those considered by the Canfield I court. The
O'Bear court reasoned that "Congress has undisputed power to deter-
mine the incentives and potential liabilities to being a director of a
federally insured savings institution." 63 Permitting state law to over-
ride Congress' decision to limit those potential liabilities to conduct
rising to the level of gross negligence would impair" 'federal superin-
tendence of the field' "64 and therefore contravene public policy.
2. Partial Preemption-The Majority View65
A majority of courts addressing § 1821(k) do not find that it fully
preempts state law. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, reviewing the district court's holding in Canfield I, both in its
58. Canfield III, 967 F.2d 443, 451-52 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 113 S.
Ct. 516 (1992).
59. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 540 (noting that "claims of ordinary negligence,
without more, may only amount to questioning business judgments").
60. Id. (noting that a uniform standard avoids the necessity of the FDIC
"wind[ing] its way through the morass of state legislation engulfing the issue of direc-
tor and officer liability").
61. Id.
62. 840 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
63. Id. at 1277.
64. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)).
65. See Schipani, supra note 30, at 761 ("Most of the district courts deciding the
section 1821(k) question support the FDIC's contention that directors and officers of
insured financial institutions may be held personally liable for actions sounding in
simple negligence under state law despite the gross negligence standard defined in
section 1821(k).").
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original hearing of the case, Canfield 11,6 and in its rehearing en banc,
Canfield 111,67 reversed the lower court, holding that § 1821(k) only
partially preempts state law. Therefore, because Utah holds directors
liable for simple negligence, the FDIC was allowed to bring a simple
negligence action based on state law.' The court in Canfield III, like
the Canfield I court, began its analysis with the "words used in section
1821(k). ' 69
a. "Plain Language"
Courts finding only partial preemption of state law under § 1821(k)
focus on different statutory language than those that find full preemp-
tion of state law. The Canfield III court first considered the term
"may" as used in § 1821(k)'s first sentence. Because "may" is a per-
missive term and does not imply a limitation on the standards of direc-
tor liability, the court explained that "no reasonable construction of
'may' results in an absolute limitation of the liability of officers or
directors to instances of gross negligence."70 Rather, to find that
§ 1821(k) preempts state law, the phrase "may be held personally lia-
ble" would have to be construed as meaning "may only be held per-
sonally liable for gross negligence."71 This the court declined to do.72
Next the Canfield III court determined that in the savings clause,
"other applicable law" means all other applicable law,73 including
state director liability law. Therefore, § 1821(k) does not impair any
right of the FDIC under state director liability law. Where state law
permits bank directors to be held liable for simple negligence, constru-
ing § 1821(k) to bar its application would impair the FDIC's rights
under that state law-contrary to the plain language of the section.
Following the general rule of construction that statutes should be
read as a whole, the court found that the language used in other parts
of FIRREA supported its construction of the last sentence of
§ 1821(k). The drafters of FIRREA used very specific language to
66. FDIC v. Canfield, 957 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.) ("Canfield II"), opinion superseded
on reh'g en banc by, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cerL dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
67. Canfield I1, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516
(1992).
68. Id at 446.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. However, the dissent noted that,
[g]iven the unmistakable purpose of § 1821(k) to define a standard of liabil-
ity, the majority's discussion of the term "may" is a red herring. Read in
context, the word "may" refers to the right of the FDIC to bring an action
under this section. "May" cannot reasonably be read to qualify the gross
negligence liability standard and is therefore irrelevant to the substance of
the provision.
Id. at 450 n.4 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
73. Id at 446.
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effectuate their intent, referring, in other parts of § 1821, specifically
to other bodies of law or to FIRREA itself. On the other hand, when
the drafters intended to refer to the whole universe of other laws, they
used the same language that is used in § 1821(k).74 Therefore, the
court reasoned that an interpretation limiting the scope of the lan-
guage "other applicable law" to "other sections of FIRREA" is
untenable.
Relying on the plain language of the statute, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to conclude that Congress intended to impose a national stan-
dard for bank director liability; FIRREA contains no language
expressing an intention to create a national standard. The court also
noted that the provision's "reliance on state law for its definition of
gross negligence directly refutes the proposition that FIRREA estab-
lishes a national standard of liability for officers or directors. 76 Be-
cause state law definitions of gross negligence differ, the court
reasoned, the statute cannot create a national standard of liability,
even if § 1821(k) fully preempts state law.77
Finally, the court contended that had Congress intended a national
standard of liability, the final sentence of § 1821(k) would be superflu-
ous. 78 Under the full preemption theory, both the first sentence and
the savings clause pronounce the same exclusive liability standard.
The court reasoned that any interpretation leading to such a result "is
necessarily less compelling than our construction, which gives each of
the sentences independent force."7 9 The court concluded that
74. Il at 447.
In other parts of section 1821, the statute refers specifically to the other bod-
ies of law it touches. Similarly, when the statute refers only to itself, it does
so specifically. Finally, when the statute refers to the whole universe of
other laws, it uses the same language employed in section 1821(k).
Id. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3)(B) ("powers imposed by State law") and 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4) ("notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the law of
any State") and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(J) ("any action authorized by this chapter")
and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(C)(ii) ("except as otherwise specifically provided in this
section") with 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e)(12)(B) ("No provision of this paragraph may be
construed as impairing or affecting any right... under other applicable law.").
75. Canfield III, 967 F.2d at 447 ("Nowhere does the statute announce its inten-
tion to create a national standard of liability ...
76. Id.
77. Id. at 447; see, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that there is "no generally accepted meaning
[of gross negligence]"); see also Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard
of Care for Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's
Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts Federal Common
Law, 13 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 169, 194-231 (1994) (detailing the various state law
definitions of both simple and gross negligence).
78. See Canfield III, 967 F.2d at 448 ("The first sentence announces the exclusive
liability standard, while the second makes the same announcement in a different
form.").
79. It.
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the explicit preemptive language moves in only one direction and its
scope is explicitly limited. The statute blocks only those state laws
that require more than gross negligence in order to establish the
personal liability of directors and officers. By saving "other applica-
ble law," the statute makes unreasonable any inference that the en-
tire field was the target of the legislation.a8
Also relying on the plain language of the statute, the district court
in FDIC v. McSweeney8 found that the partial preemption analysis is
supported by the fact that the FDIC is granted "all rights, titles, pow-
ers, and privileges [enjoyed by] any stockholder, member.., deposi-
tor, officer, or director" of a failed bank.2 The court reasoned that
because the stockholders of a bank in a state with a simple negligence
standard are granted certain rights for claims based on conduct not
amounting to gross negligence, the FDIC must also enjoy those rights.
Reading § 1821(k) as fully preempting state law would impair the
rights of the FDIC when "FIRREA itself means to provide the FDIC
access to [the same] arsenal." Affirming the lower court's decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit added that "[j]udicially
construing an implied loss of existing remedies is particularly inappro-
priate when applied to the rights of the government."''
b. Legislative History
Courts finding that § 1821(k) only partially preempts state law look
to the same three relevant sources of legislative history examined by
the district court in Canfield I:as the Conference Report, the Senate
Report, and a Senate floor debate.86 As discussed above,81 however,
the legislative history is unclear, and where legislative history "'cuts
both ways,'" courts rely more heavily on the words of the statute and
on policy considerations.88
80. Id.
81. 772 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Cal 1991), aff'd, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 2440 (1993).
82. 12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(2)(A)(I) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
83. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. at 1159.
84. FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2440 (1993).
85. See, e.g., Canfield II, 957 F.2d 786,789 (10th Cir.), opinion superseded on rehg
by 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992) (reviewing Confer-
ence Report, Senate Report, and Senate floor debate).
86. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
88. Canfield II, 957 F.2d at 791 (quoting Miller v. C.I.R., 836 F.2d 1274, 1284 (10th
Cir. 1988)). It should also be noted that many courts assert that the legislative history
does support their respective position. For example, the district court in FDIC v.
McSweeney maintained that the legislative history supported its finding that § 1821(k)
does not preempt state laws with a simple negligence standard of liability:
When considering the Section, Congress was particularly concerned that in
recent years many states had enacted legislation "insulating" directors and
officers for certain suits, and that while no one wanted to preempt all of state
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c. Public Policy
The Canfield III court suggested that the policy arguments against a
simple negligence standard were addressed to the wrong forum.89 The
court's role is to apply the existing law; it is the role of the legislature
to consider the need for uniformity and the need to attract qualified
directors willing to serve in a particular state. Despite its deference to
the legislature, however, Canfield III did consider one troubling policy
consideration. Under the district court's full preemption interpreta-
tion, § 1821(k) creates an incentive for negligent bank directors to al-
low their banks to fail. Where state law held directors to a simple
negligence standard, prior to failure liability would attach for simple
negligence. After failure, however, "liability would only attach if the
officer or director could be proven grossly negligent under the appli-
cable state definition. As the institution struggles, therefore, section
1821(k) would create an incentive for the officers and directors to al-
low the bank to fail." 9 The Canfield III court was concerned that a
finding of full preemption of state law would permit bank directors to
deliberately allow their banks to fail in order to shield themselves
against simple negligence claims.
Other courts finding partial preemption of state law were not so
deferential to Congress. The district court in McSweeney, for exam-
ple, found that the need to attract qualified directors does not support
a national gross negligence standard, and that this public interest ra-
law, it was viewed as necessary to "allow the FDIC to sue a director or of-
ficer guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct, even if State law did
not allow it." Thus, the legislative history confirms that Congress established
a jurisdictional basis upon which the FDIC could be assured of bringing suit
in the most serious cases of alleged director mismanagement, while at the
same time not prejudicing the FDIC's full range of rights in those states that
had not passed protective legislation for directors.
FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting 135 Cong.
Rec. §§ 4278-79 (April 19, 1989)) (emphasis added), aff'd, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993).
As already mentioned, however, the Conference Report stated that § 1821(k)
"preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capcity [sic]
against officers or directors of an insured depository institution." H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 393,398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437. In
the end, courts attempting to use the legislative history of FIRREA to bolster their
interpretation are misled. "[Dlue to the time pressure" under which FIRREA was
rushed through Congress, the legislative history is simply insufficient and indistinct. S.
Rep. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S6934 (daily ed. June 19, 1989). At
best, "FIRREA's legislative history can be faithfully read as sending conflicting sig-
nals," RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1993), because "the legislative
history is contradictory and [therefore] certainly not dispositive." FDIC v. Mintz, 816
F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
89. Canfield III, 967 F.2d 443, 448 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516
(1992).
90. Id- at 449. The dissent argues in reply, however, that more likely than not
"deliberate conduct designed to allow a bank to fail in order to take advantage of the
gross negligence standard would in and of itself constitute gross negligent conduct
actionable under § 1821(k)." Id. at 451 n.9.
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tionale is in fact at odds with the goals of FIRREA.91 Whereas "FIR-
REA sought to strengthen the hand of federal regulators in pursuing
those responsible for the mismanagement of failed thrifts,"' preemp-
tion of simple negligence standards weakens the position of the FDIC
by imposing a more stringent pleading burden.93
Courts have thus made cogent and plausible arguments for both full
preemption and partial preemption of state law. Nevertheless, as far
as sheer numbers go, the partial preemption contingent is winning the
debate.94
B. Preemption of Federal Common Law
Courts also set out cogent and plausible arguments regarding pre-
emption of federal common law by § 1821(k), though here too, there
is disagreement. Indeed, there is not even a consensus regarding the
proper standard of liability for bank directors under federal common
law or whether there even is any federal common law concerning
bank director liability.
Some courts explicitly acknowledge that the federal common law
recognizes a simple negligence cause of action against bank directors.
For example, the court in RTC v. Miramon95 acknowledged the exist-
ence of a federal common law standard of simple negligence in its
conclusion that FIRREA's gross negligence standard supersedes fed-
eral common law.96 Likewise, the court in FDIC v. Mintz9' held that
§ 1821(k) preempts the federal common law standard of simple
negligence.9
On the other hand, some courts hold that the federal common law
standard is gross negligence or that there is no federal common law
concerning bank director liability. For example, in Washington Ban-
corporation v. Said,99 the court held that federal common law estab-
91. FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991). aff'd, 976 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993).
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id
94. See supra note 30.
95. Civ. A. No. 92-2672, 1992 WL 373635 (E.D. La. Dec. 9,1992), motion to certify
denied, 1994 WL 90488 (E.D. La. March 11, 1994), aff'd, 22 F3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994).
96. Id. at *2 ("FIRREA's standard of gross negligence supersedes the federal
common-law standard of simple negligence.").
97. 816 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
98. 1& at 1544 (finding "that the federal common law standard of simple negli-
gence is preempted by § 1821(k)"); see also FDIC v. Bates, 838 F. Supp. 1216, 1218
(N.D. Ohio 1993) ("[The] issue is whether 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) establishes a national
standard of gross negligence for director liability, thereby preempting federal com-
mon law permitting liability for simple negligence."), aff'd in part, 42 F.3d 369 (6th
Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1276 (N.D. IlL 1991) (holding that
§ 1821(k) "must take precedence over previous judicial determinations articulating
'federal common law' claims based on allegations of conduct less egregious than gross
negligence").
99. 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C. 1993).
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fishes a standard of gross negligence. 100 In FDIC v. Gonzalez-
Gorrondona,10' the court stated that it was "not fully convinced" that
federal common law provides a claim for simple negligence. 0 2 But in
First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander,0 3 the court expressly held that
there is no federal common law claim for negligence against bank
directors.1' 4
Even assuming for the present discussion, however, that the stan-
dard of liability for bank directors under federal common law is sim-
ple negligence, federal courts are split as to whether § 1821(k) permits
or preempts claims under that federal common law standard.
1. No Preemption of Federal Common Law-The Minority
View'05
Generally, the arguments concerning federal common law are
framed in the same terms as those concerning state law-plain lan-
guage, legislative history, and public policy. Because the analysis of
the legislative history of § 1821(k) regarding preemption of federal
common law mirrors the discussions by courts addressing the question
with regard to state law, discussions of preemption of federal common
law will be considered only where courts have added significantly to
the previous discussion.
100. Ma at 1266 (noting that "both D.C. law and federal common law hold the di-
rectors. . . to a gross negligence standard").
101. 833 F. Supp. 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
102. Id. at 1550. The court noted further that
in light of the stated purpose of FIRREA... of strengthening the FDIC's
enforcement powers and to increase the civil sanctions for S & L misman-
agement-the enactment by § 1821(k) of a gross-negligence-or-higher fed-
eral standard . . . would run counter to that stated purpose if the FDIC
already had a federal common law claim for ordinary negligence in its
arsenal.
Id at 1552 (emphasis omitted); see also FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 304
(N.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that "no federal common law cause of action exists for the
simple negligence of officers and directors"); RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1121
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting that because the "government did not have a federal com-
mon law action for negligence prior to enactment of § 1821(k) .... no such right
existed for the savings clause to preserve").
103. 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw. 1983).
104. Id. at 1131 ("Negligence is an area traditionally left to the state courts. There
is no interest in national uniformity which would be served by the creation or applica-
tion of any federal decisional law... . Therefore this court declines to recognize a
federal common law cause of action for negligence.").
105. See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that "the
majority of district courts have agreed with the appellees that § 1821(k) pre-empts
federal common law"); Joyce E. Raupp, Recent Cases, 6 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 91,
99 (1994) ("A majority of district courts, however, have held that Section 1821(k)
preempts federal common law.").
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a. Plain Language
Under the plain language analysis, courts addressing the question of
preemption of federal common law find that the statutory language
"may" is a permissive term and that "other applicable law" means all
other applicable law. For example, the court in FDIC v. Nihiser,'"
adopting the rationale used in McSweeney and FDIC v. Black,"0
found that the "permissive language of the first sentence and the
broad language of the savings clause clearly evidence the intent to
preserve the FDIC's rights under other laws, including state and fed-
eral common law."' 0 The Nihiser court concluded that federal com-
mon law is not preempted; § 1821(k) would not preempt or repeal
common law rights unless the language of the statute demonstrated
clearly that that was its purpose-and it did not.109 The court in RTC
v. Hess, 10 following the reasoning of Canfield Iii as it pertained to the
word "may" and the phrase "other applicable law," held that
§ 1821(k) does not preempt applicable state or federal common
law."' Similarly, the court in FDIC v. McSweeney" 2 held that the
language of the savings clause preserves the FDIC's preexisting rights
under federal common law."13
b. Public Policy
The public policy arguments against preemption of federal common
law, as well as the plain language and legislative history arguments,
vary little from the analysis employed by courts addressing whether
§ 1821(k) preempts state law. For example, the court in RTC v.
Frates"4 adopted the public policy reasoning of McSweeney, finding
that preclusion of federal common law remedies "would lead to ab-
surd results, creating "the perverse incentive for a director in an in-
stitution that is having difficulty to permit the thrift to fall into ruin...
since the director's own exposure would be greatly reduced upon the
institution of a receivership,"'" when § 1821(k) and its gross negli-
gence standard would apply." 5 The court in RTC v. Gibson"16 rea-
106. 799 F. Supp. 904 (C.D. M11. 1992).
107. 777 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
108. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. at 907.
109. IL
110. 820 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Utah 1993).
111. Id. at 1364 (holding that "§ 1821(k) does not set a minimum federal liability
standard of gross negligence, and... does not preempt applicable state law or federal
common law").
112. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993).
113. IL at 538 n.7 (holding that "the express saving language preserving the FDIC's
rights 'under other applicable law' would preserve its preexisting rights under the
federal common law").
114. No. 93-C-123-E, 1993 WL 729628 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 16, 1993).
115. Id at *2 (quoting McSweeney, 976 F2d at 540 (quoting FDIC v. McSweeney,
772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 2440 (1993))).
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soned that one of the purposes of FIRREA is to strengthen the
powers of government regulators over officers and directors engaging
in harmful misconduct. Thus, interpreting § 1821(k) as preempting
'federal common law
frees officers and directors from the federal common law standards
of liability and thereby affords them greater protection than they
enjoyed prior to the enactment of § 1821(k). Interpreting § 1821(k)
to strip the government of its federal common law powers, under
which it could hold officers and directors liable for less than gross
negligence, is inconsistent with Congress' stated purposes. 17
Interpreting § 1821(k) as preempting federal common law, therefore,
is inconsistent with public policy.
2. Preemption of Federal Common Law-The Majority View118
Courts holding that § 1821(k) preempts federal common law begin
their analysis with a different premise: namely, that it is the role of
Congress, not the courts, to determine the applicable federal stan-
dards.119 When a court determines that a statutory scheme estab-
lished by Congress directly addresses the problem formerly governed
by federal common law, it necessarily determines that any previously
existing common law action has been displaced by the congressional
scheme. 120
a. Plain Language
Starting from this premise, courts holding that federal common law
is preempted reason that by enacting § 1821(k), Congress "spoke di-
rectly" to the issue of bank director liability.12 ' For example, as one
district court held:
Congress has now expressly defined the magnitude of negligence
which would give rise to a federal cause of action against officers
and directors of federally insured financial institutions .... [T~he
explicit definition of the standard of actionable conduct-"gross
negligence"- in § 1821(k) must take precedence over previous ju-
116. 829 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
117. Id. at 1119.
118. See supra note 105.
119. See RTC v. Vanderweele, 833 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (N.D. Ind. 1993) ("In deter-
mining a statute's effect on previously existing federal common law, the court starts
'with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appro-
priate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.'" (quoting City of Milwau-
kee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981))).
120. FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (not-
ing that a court's "determination of 'whether a previously available common-law ac-
tion has been displaced by federal statutory law involves an assessment of the scope
of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress addresses the
problem formerly governed by federal common law.'" (quoting City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981))).
121. FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1275 (N.D. IMI. 1991).
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dicial determinations articulating "federal common law" claims
based on allegations of conduct less egregious than gross
negligence.'"2
To support this assertion, courts holding that federal common law is
preempted reason that if § 1821(k) were construed to preserve federal
common law simple negligence causes of action, the provision requir-
ing gross negligence would have no effect." 1 The FDIC could use the
federal common law to bring a simple negligence action instead of
being constrained by FIRREA's explicit gross negligence standard.
Under such a reading,
the general language of the "savings clause" would be permitted to
swallow-up the specific language establishing a gross negligence
standard of liability. Reading the "savings clause" as preserving a
federal common law standard of liability for less culpable conduct
than gross negligence would render the substantive portion of sec-
tion 1821(k) surplusage.... It is illogical that Congress intended in
one sentence to establish a gross negligence standard of liability and
in the next sentence to eviscerate that standard by allowing actions
under federal common law for simple negligence."-4
When these courts discuss the actual language of § 1821(k), they
adopt many of the arguments made in favor of preemption of state
law. For example, in RTC v. Gallagher,"-5 the court, citing the dissent
in Canfield III, reasoned that the word "may" is understood to refer to
the right of the FDIC to bring an action under § 1821(k) and cannot
"reasonably be read to qualify the ross negligence liability stan-
dard."'26 Similarly, in RTC v. Camhi,1§7 the court mirrored the analy-
sis made in Canfield , finding that the savings clause should be
interpreted to preserve the FDIC's other regulatory powers under
FIRREA. For example, the savings clause preserves the FDIC's au-
thority "to remove directors for simple negligence, or their power to
issue 'cease and desist' orders in cases of simple negligence. Without
the savings clause, FIRREA could have been interpreted to withdraw
from these agencies the other regulatory powers that they previously
possessed."' 2 8 The plain language of § 1821(k), therefore, should be
interpreted as preempting federal common law.
122. Id at 1275-76; see also FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 191 (W.D. La. 1991)
("In enacting § 1812(k) [sic], Congress created a federal statutory standard applicable
to officers and directors of national banks. Any federal common law in existence
previous to the enactment of FIRREA would be superseded by the statute."), aff'd,
995 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. Miller, 781 F. Supp. at 1275-76.
124. RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1993).
125. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
126. Id at 420.
127. 861 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Conn. 1994).
128. Id. at 1128 (citation omitted).
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b. Legislative History
Although most discussions of § 1821(k)'s legislative history reassess
the same material discussed with regard to preemption of state law,
the court in Gallagher129 pointed to two post-enactment efforts to
amend § 1821(k) that imply that federal common law is preempted.
First, the FDIC submitted a proposed amendment that would have
reintroduced a simple negligence standard. 30 Second, Congressman
Richard Baker proposed a similar amendment to the savings clause,
which also would have reintroduced a simple negligence standard. 13 1
Neither proposal was adopted by Congress. The Gallagher court rea-
soned that "[t]hese post-enactment efforts to amend section 1821(k)
to reinstate a simple negligence standard of liability belie the... con-
tention that section 1821(k), as enacted, preserved a federal common
law action for simple negligence."' 132
c. Public Policy
Finally, the public policy arguments in favor of preemption of fed-
eral common law are analogous to the arguments made by courts
holding that § 1821(k) preempts state law. These courts conclude
that, given the comprehensive enforcement mechanism created by
FIRREA, including the establishment of several expert regulatory
agencies to supervise that mechanism, it is simply not the job of the
courts to try to embellish that program through federal common law
decisions. 13
3
C. Choosing What Law to Apply
As if there were not enough confusion surrounding § 1821(k), there
is also turmoil concerning what law to apply to each bank. Section
1821(k), regardless of whether it is found to preempt state law, can be
applied to both federal and state-chartered banks.'34 Where courts
129. 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993).
130. Id at 423 n.7 ("The FDIC amendment provided: 'Nothing in this subsection
shall impair or affect any right of the [RTCI under other applicable state or federal
law, including a right to hold such director or officer personally liable for
negligence.' ").
131. Id at 423 n.8 ("The Baker amendment provided: 'Paragraph (1) shall not be
construed as impairing or affecting any right of the... [RTC] under any provision of
applicable State or other Federal law, including any provision of common law or any
law establishing the personal liability of any director or officer of an insured deposi-
tory institution under any standard pursuant to such law.' ").
132. Id. at 423. The court did not appreciate, however, the fact that these efforts to
amend § 1821(k) may simply have been an effort to make clear, after the numerous
divergent court decisions, that § 1821(k) was not intended to preempt state laws con-
taining a simple negligence standard of bank director liability.
133. Id at 424.
134. See FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244, 1248-49 (D. Minn. 1991) (finding that
FIRREA preempted state law and allowing gross negligence claims against a state-
chartered bank to proceed under § 1821(k)).
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hold that FIRREA does not preempt state law, state law simple negli-
gence claims are clearly cognizable against directors of state-chartered
banks.13 5 It is unsettled, however, whether state law applies to feder-
ally chartered banks.
Many cases hold that state law can be applied to federally chartered
banks. For example, in RTC v. Gibson,136 the court noted that
"[tihere is nothing to suggest that officers and directors of federally
chartered institutions are only subject to federal causes of action." 1 37
Similarly, in RTC v. Ascher,138 the court reasoned that § 1821(k) al-
lows state based claims for ordinary negligence against the directors of
a federally chartered institution.'3 9
In RTC v. Hess,'4 however, the court concluded that
[f]ederal savings and loan institutions are federally chartered, feder-
ally regulated, federally insured, and federally organized. Such com-
prehensive coverage leaves little or no room for state law claims.
Allowing state law to govern the actions of directors of federal sav-
ings and loan associations would result in different and conflicting
standards of conduct in the different states, thus impeding Congress'
goal of treating such institutions in a uniform manner. For these
reasons, it is apparent that as a general rule federal law exclusively
governs the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associations,
including director liability.' 4 1
Similarly, in RTC v. Chapman,42 the court applied the internal affairs
doctrine, which states that the law presumptively applicable to a cor-
poration's internal affairs, such as director liability, is the law of the
place of incorporation. 4 3 Thus, where a bank holds a federal charter,
national law governs the issue of liability for director
mismanagement. 44
135. See FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559, 1566-67 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that
state common law claims were not preempted by FIRREA and allowing state law
claims against a banking corporation organized under Florida law).
136. 829 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
137. Id. at 1109 n,2.
138. Civ. A. No. 92-B-424, 1994 WL 52687 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 1994) (opinion with-
drawn Feb. 25, 1994).
139. Id. at *3 (holding that "the savings clause of section 1821(k) allows the RTC to
bring state based claims for ordinary negligence against the director defendants of a
federally insured, federally-chartered institution").
140. 820 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Utah 1993).
141. Id. at 1362 (citations omitted); see also RTC v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302, 307
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (declining to reach issues of liability standard under state law "since
the bank is federally chartered and is not incorporated under and regulated by state
law").
142. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
143. Id at 1122.
144. Id. at 1123 (holding that "national law governs the liability of officers and di-
rectors for their management"); see also RTC v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595, 602
(N.D. IM. 1992), aff'd, 10 F3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993). The banks involved in Gallagher
were federally chartered, federally regulated, federally insured thrifts which were or-
ganized under federal law. Moreover, [one of the banks] was declared insolvent and
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Additionally, it is not clear in jurisdictions where courts have held
that § 1821(k) does not preempt federal common law, whether the
FDIC or RTC may pursue directors of state-chartered banks under
the federal common law standard. After determining that federal law
exclusively governs federally chartered banks,'45 the court in RTC v.
Hess held that federal common law does not apply to state chartered,
federally insured banks.14 6 At least two courts, however, in cases
dealing with issues other than § 1821(k), have applied federal com-
mon law against state chartered, federally insured banks.147 In First
Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander,14 the court found that First Hawaiian
Bank, a state chartered bank, was "federally insured and as a result
subject to the same laws governing federal associations.
D. The State of the Law
There is clearly no consensus on the preemptive reach of § 1821(k).
Some courts have held that § 1821(k) preempts both state and federal
common law, while others have concluded that the statute preempts
federal, but not state, common law. Still others have ruled that the
statute displaces neither state nor federal common law. 150
This division among the federal judiciary has led to an interesting
predicament. Courts holding that § 1821(k) preempts federal com-
mon law, but not state law, apply one line of reasoning to support
preemption of federal common law, but then apply contradictory rea-
soning to preserve state law simple negligence claims.'15  These courts
concede that this interpretation of the statute can be characterized as
"'splitting the baby,' "152 but nevertheless attempt to explain why do-
ing so is consistent. 53 In reality, however, the results are internally
inconsistent and are, therefore, somewhat troubling. For example, in
placed into conservatorship and ultimately receivership pursuant to federal law. In
addition, [the bank] was placed into receivership with a federal agency. In essence,
[the bank] was a creature of federal law "from its cradle to its corporate grave." Id.(quoting Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819, 823
(N.D. IM. 1975)). As a result, the court found no basis for any state law claims. Id.
145. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
146. RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (D. Utah 1993) ("[Federal common law
should not be applied to state chartered, federally-insured associations."); see also
FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply federal
common law to a case involving a state-chartered, federally insured association), va-
cated on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989).
147. See FSLIC v. Sajovich, 642 F. Supp. 74, 77 (C.D. Cal. 1986); First Hawaiian
Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128, 1131-32 (D. Haw. 1983).
148. 558 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Haw. 1983).
149. ItL at 1132.
150. RTC v. Zimmerman, 853 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
151. See FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541, 1544-45 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
152. Id at 1545.
153. See RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Wle would not
think it prudent to create a conflict among the circuits."); Mintz, 816 F. Supp. at 1545
("[T]his construction gives all of the provisions in the section meaning.").
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RTC v. Rahn,1" the RTC was suing the directors of a bank that was
originally a state-chartered bank, but later became a federally
chartered bank.155 On a summary judgment motion, the court held
that § 1821(k) preempted federal common law,'5 6 but that it did not
preempt state law simple negligence claims." Thus, a state law negli-
gence claim against defendants would survive summary judgment in-
sofar as the claims related to the time when the bank was state-
chartered. 58 The court also held, however, that state law claims could
not be brought against directors of a federally chartered bank. There-
fore, claims asserted against the former directors which pertained to
the period when the bank was federally chartered must be brought
under FIRREA's standard-gross negligence as defined by state
law.' 59 Thus, under this "split" approach, the same directors of the
same bank are held to two different standards for the same actions on
two different days-the day before the bank converted to a federal
charter and the day after.
Clearly, the case law interpreting § 1821(k) is problematic: judicial
interpretation of the section has produced a plethora of inconsistent
holdings. These holdings, however, are the consequence of the ambig-
uous language of § 1821(k); "Congress' choice of language in 12
U.S.C. section 1821(k) is susceptible to two valid yet opposing inter-
pretations."'160 The case for preemption of state law, based primarily
on the need for uniformity and the need to attract qualified and com-
petent directors to banks, is as compelling as is the case for partial
preemption of state law, based on the plain language of the statute
and the need to hold bank directors liable for their misconduct. Simi-
larly, the case for preemption of federal common law is as compelling
as is the case for allowing simple negligence claims based on federal
common law. Few courts, however, are willing to concede the merit of
each of the competing interpretations, 16' and to resolve this conflict
by focusing on the real task of deciding why to adopt one approach
over another. 62
Thus, the judicial focus on the plain language of the statute-on the
words "may" and "other applicable law"-is misplaced, as is the de-
154. 854 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
155. Id at 481.
156. Id at 485.
157. Id at 489.
158. Id at 492.
159. Id
160. Canfield III, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.) (Brorby, J., dissenting), cert. dis-
missed, 113 S. CL 516 (1992).
161. But see RTC v. Zimmerman, 853 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (noting
that "[e]ach of the competing interpretations of section 1821(k) has some merit").
162. Canfield 111, 967 F.2d at 449 (Brorby, J., dissenting) ("Few are so naive as to
believe there exists but a single correct interpretation of any given statute. Those who
are intellectually honest admit the real question is: Which 'correct' interpretation will
the court adopt, and why?").
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bate over an inconclusive legislative history. The real question is
which public policy should be encouraged and why. In the words of
Circuit Judge Brorby, dissenting in Canfield III, the numerous inter-
pretations of § 1821(k) are all "supportable and.., well written; how-
ever, [the courts] ha[ve] lost sight of the forest but for a single tree.
When construing statutes we must remember 'laws are not abstract
propositions. They are expressions of policy arising out of specific sit-
uations and addressed to the attainment of particular ends.' "163
Hence the focus of the debate over § 1821(k) should be on which pub-
lic policy that section should further.
II. DEPosrr INSURANCE AND SEcrON 1821(K)
The public policy behind bank director liability cannot be examined
in a vacuum. Section 1821(k) was enacted as part of a huge legislative
package aimed at thorough realignment of the bank regulatory struc-
ture. Thus, any examination of the policy issues concerning bank di-
rector liability must begin with the policy behind the nation's bank
regulatory framework, specifically the policy underlying the deposit
insurance system.
A. The Birth of the FDIC
Congress established the FDIC in 1933 following the worst banking
crisis in the nation's history. During the period from 1921 through
1929, an average of more than 600 banks per year failed, over ten
times the failure rate of the past decade. 64 Despite their numbers,
these earlier failures elicited relatively little concern because they in-
volved mostly small town banks.165 This ambivalent attitude disap-
peared, however, after 1350 banks suspended their operations during
the last few months of 1930.166 The failures were no longer confined
to rural, agricultural areas but affected even large New York City
banks, such as the esteemed Bank of United States, one of the na-
tion's largest banks.167 Driven by a fear that their banks were next,
depositors began to panic and lose confidence in the banking system,
attempting, en masse, to withdraw deposits. 168
The peculiar nature of the banking industry made banks highly sus-
ceptible to failure during these "bank runs." Banks in the early twen-
tieth century served two major functions: accepting demand deposits
163. Id (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947), reprinted in 3 N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construc-
tion 265, 272 (4th ed. 1986)).
164. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 33.
165. Id.
166. Id at 35.
167. Id
168. See id. at 33.
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and making commercial loans.16 9 By providing a "safe place for small,
unsophisticated depositors to store liquid assets,"170 banks accumu-
lated liquid assets. Banks used their accumulated liquid deposits to
supply credit to other institutions, thereby facilitating economic
growth.' 7 These functions, however, exposed the banks to a serious
risk of failure. A bank's deposits (its primary liabilities) were due
(withdrawable) at any time, while its loans (its primary assets) were
due at a specified time in the future.1 2 In other words, a bank's pri-
mary liabilities were
liquid bank deposits, or extremely short-term liabilities that are
often withdrawable on demand. At the same time, bank assets are
concentrated in highly illiquid loans, which cannot be sold quickly
without a loss in value. The combination of these two factors makes
banks inherently susceptible to depositor runs, or panic withdrawals
of deposits.
17 3
Thus, when many depositors of even a healthy bank suddenly de-
manded cash, the bank was often unable to meet those demands be-
cause its assets, the depositors' money, were tied up in illiquid loans.
Where enough depositors suddenly sought to convert their deposits to
cash, the resulting liquidity crises caused the bank's failure. 74
The effect of bank runs and subsequent bank failures quickly spread
to other banks. First, they undermined the public confidence in the
banking system as a whole, causing depositors even of sound banks to
question whether their money was safe and often encouraging these
depositors to withdraw their own deposits. Thus, one bank run trig-
gered another in a domino effect.
In addition, because banks served as an engine for economic
growth, a single bank failure decreased the investment capital avail-
able to the entire community. Other banks were forced to compen-
169. Oulton v. Savings Inst., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 109, 118 (1872).
Banks in the commercial sense are of three kinds, to wit: 1, of deposit; 2, of
discount; 3, of circulation. Strictly speaking the term bank implies a place
for the deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an
institution. Originally the business of banking consisted only in receiving
deposits, such as bullion, plate, and the like, for safe-keeping until the depos-
itor should see fit to draw it out for use, but the business, in the progress of
events, was extended, and bankers assumed to discount bills and notes and
to loan money upon mortgage, pawn, or other security, and at a still later
period to issue notes of their own intended as a circulating currency and a
medium of exchange instead of gold and silver.
ld.
170. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommen-
dations for Safer, More Competitive Banks 2 (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Study].
171. 1& at ix (noting that "lending [was] an important engine for economic
growth").
172. Robert E. Litan, What Should Banks Do? 11 (1987).
173. Treasury Study, supra note 170, at 3.
174. Id. ("Sooner or later, a run will itself cause a bank to fail, regardless of the
bank's actual condition at the time the run began.").
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sate for the loss of this source of funding or economic growth would
be stifled. Although the banking community could compensate for
the failure of individual banks, the combined failure of bank after
bank increasingly strained the banking system to its limits.175
In the early 1930s these factors combined to bring the banking sys-
tem to a screeching halt.
[The] wave of bank failures during the last few months of 1930 trig-
gered widespread attempts to convert deposits to cash. Many
banks, seeking to accommodate cash demands or increase liquidity,
contracted credit, and, in some cases, liquidated assets. This re-
duced the quantity of cash available to the community which, in
turn, placed additional cash demands on banks. Banks were forced
to restrict credit and liquidate assets, further depressing asset prices
and exacerbating liquidity problems. As more banks were unable to
meet withdrawals and were closed, depositors became more sensi-
tive to rumors. Confidence in the banking system began to erode
and bank 'runs' became more common.
As depositor confidence failed, and the number of bank runs in-
creased, the banking system fell into turmoil. During 1931 alone, 2293
banks failed, followed by 1453 in 1932, and 4000 in 1933.177 During
the beginning of 1933, the number of bank runs increased suddenly,
causing every state in the union to declare a bank holiday.178 Subse-
quently, President Roosevelt proclaimed a nationwide bank holiday,
stating to Congress that "the government has been compelled to step
in for the protection of depositors and the business of the nation.' ' 7
Prior to the banking crisis of the 1930s, there was relatively little
regulation at either the state or federal levels.180 This free environ-
ment, however, would not last long. The stockmarket crash of 1929
and the accompanying nationwide series of bank failures through the
mid-1930s "provided catastrophic evidence of the need for further im-
provements in the nation's bank regulatory system."'' The FDIC
was born amid the ruins of the worst banking crisis in the nation's
history when President Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933.1'
175. See Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Con-
trol Bank Risks, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 129, 161-62 (1986) ("Although the repercussions of
individual bank failure can be tolerated if a sufficient number of healthy banks remain
in operation, as the liquidity crisis spreads, each successive failure puts additional
strain on the rest of the banking system.").
176. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 33.
177. Id at 36.
178. Id at 38.
179. Id at iii.
180. See id at 132-33 (noting that the "environment was characterized by relatively
free banking").
181. 1 Malloy, supra note 2, at 1.66.
182. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at iii.
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B. The Banking Act of 1933
The government responded to the crises of the early 1930s with the
creation of the Banking Act of 1933 .1a3 The 1933 Act had two major
effects. First, it required all banking institutions to restrict their busi-
ness activities either to the field of commercial banking (e.g., receiving
deposits) or to investment banking functions. 1' Second, the Act cre-
ated a deposit insurance system and a supervisory agency to oversee
that system, the FDIC.S8s
Prior to the 1933 Act, commercial banks increasingly had become
involved in investment activities."8 Their involvement was such that
by "the end of the decade commercial banks and their affiliates had
become the dominant force in the investment banking field."" s In the
wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent banking
crisis, however, legislative reformers like Senator Carter Glass, along
with other banking authorities, came to regard investment banking
and "stock gambling" as intrinsically risky and speculative ' 88 and a
threat to the economic stability of commercial banking. Therefore,
they "considered any dealings in stocks and bonds an improper busi-
ness pursuit for financial institutions entrusted with the savings of the
general public." 89 Congress, under pressure to halt the persistent
wave of bank failures and reintroduce stability into the financial sys-
tem, divorced investment from commercial banking. 9° By prohibiting
"stock gambling" altogether, the reformers believed that fewer banks
would fail and the banking system would thus stabilize itself.
The 1933 Act also created a system of federal deposit insurance and
the FDIC.'91 By establishing a system of deposit insurance, Congress
intended "to insure bank deposits and reduce the economic disrup-
tions caused by bank failures."'192 Deposit insurance contributes to
the stability of the banking system in two ways. First, deposit insur-
ance protects depositors. In turn, this protection prevents depositors,
during a financial crisis, from stampeding into a bank to convert de-
183. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.).
184. Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A His-
tory, 88 Banking LJ. 483, 483 (1971).
185. George C. Seward & Roger M. Zaitzeff, Insurability of Brokered Deposits: A
Legislative Analysis, 39 Sec. of Bus. L. of the A.B.A. 1705, 1706 (1984).
186. 2 Malloy, supra note 2, at 7.14 ("The number of banks engaged in investment
activities, either directly or through affiliates, was steadily rising during the 1920s.").
187. Perkins, supra note 184, at 495.
188. Id at 499 (citing Carter Glass, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21,
1929).
189. Perkins, supra note 184, at 485.
190. IL at 521.
191. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 40 (noting that reformers and the gen-
eral public agreed that "recent events had shown that a system of federal deposit
insurance was necessary to achieve and maintain financial stability").
192. Id at 3.
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posits to cash. Their deposits, if lost in a bank failure, are covered by
the FDIC. 93 Second, because depositor funds are protected and runs
are therefore less likely, banks are able to attract deposits and rely
upon those deposits to make long-term loans, thus promoting eco-
nomic growth while maintaining stability.194 Deposit insurance, by
protecting individual deposits, also functions to "protect communities,
states, and the nation against the economic consequences of wide-
spread bank failure,"'9 5 thereby reinstilling confidence in the entire
banking system.
Deposit insurance, however, does not eliminate the risk of bank
failure. Instead, deposit insurance protects depositors by shifting the
risk of bank failure from depositors to the FDIC.1 96 When a bank
fails, it is no longer the depositor who loses, but the deposit insurance
fund. Deposit insurance gave the federal government "a direct eco-
nomic stake in the health of our financial institutions."" It exposed
the federal government, and ultimately the taxpayer, to a significant
portion of the risk of bank failure.
The possibility that the taxpayer might be exposed to the costs asso-
ciated with bank failure provided a powerful justification for bank
regulation and supervision: Bank activities should be monitored and
restricted to limit the exposure of the insurance system.'9 8 This ra-
tionale led Congress, in 1935, to give significant supervisory powers to
the FDIC that enabled it to regulate and examine certain insured
193. William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial
Services Industry, 1 Yale J. on Reg. 195, 200 (1984); see also John L. Douglas, Deposit
Insurance Reform, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 11, 16 (1992) (describing the ameliorating
effect of FDIC protection on banking stability).
194. See Douglas, supra note 193, at 16.
[T]he FDICs' protection of depositors had an ameliorating effect on com-
mercial banks. It allowed commercial banks to rely upon a more stable
source of funding [deposits] and to avoid maintaining large cash reserves
while forced to liquidate long term assets at inopportune times. Banks, thus,
had the confidence to convert cash deposits into longer term investments -
the loans that allow our economy to function.
Id.
195. Isaac, supra note 193, at 200.
196. Douglas, supra note 193, at 15.
197. See id. at 16.
The costs associated with bank failure, due to the deposit insurance obliga-
tion, directly justify the plethora of rules and regulations imposed on banks
and thrifts today. By assuming a significant portion of the risk from the
marketplace, the government has been forced to play part of the role the
marketplace might otherwise demand of banks by attempting to regulate
that banks operate in a safe and sound manner.
Id.
198. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 133 ("The establishment of the FDIC
provided an additional rationale for bank supervision, which was monitoring and re-
stricting bank risk to limit the exposure of the insurance system.").
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banks."9 Initially, Congress granted the FDIC the authority only "to
arrange for the payment of depositors, up to the insured maximum,
after a bank was closed and placed in liquidation." 2" Since that time,
however, the FDIC has been delegated extensive statutory authority
to enforce safe and sound banking practices and to prevent and pro-
hibit unsafe and unsound banking practices.20' The FDIC has signifi-
cant regulatory responsibility in order to minimize the risk of loss to
the deposit insurance fund.2°
The banking crisis of 1933 fundamentally altered bank regulation.
Prior to the crisis, both federal and state governments subscribed to a
laissez-faire approach to banking. The crisis of 1933, however, forced
those attitudes to change.20 3 The crisis precipitated a realization that
the functions served by banks call for stability in the banking industry
and that a relatively heavy dose of federal regulation was necessary to
ensure the soundness and stability of the banking system."3 In addi-
tion, by giving the government a direct stake in the success of financial
institutions, deposit insurance provided an additional rationale for
heavy regulation by the FDIC: protection of the insurance fund, and
the taxpayer.
Since 1933, FDIC regulation has been fairly successful in protecting
both depositors and the insurance fund.20 5 The vast majority of de-
199. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 1, 49 Stat. 684 (1935); see also History of the
FDIC, supra note 24, at 52-53 (discussing the powers granted); Seward & Zaitzeff,
supra note 185, at 1707.
200. Isaac, supra note 193, at 202.
201. 1 Malloy, supra note 2, at 1.67.
202. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 113.
203. See E. Gerald Corrigan, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Are Banks
Special?, in Annual Report 8 (1982).
Banks and bank regulators have long since recognized the importance of
banks acting in ways that preserve public confidence in banks' capacity to
meet their deposit obligations, thereby minimizing the likelihood of large,
sudden drains of bank deposits.... Indeed, deposit insurance... consti-
tute[s] a public safety net under the deposit taking function of banks. The
presence of this public safety net reflects a long-standing consensus that
banking functions are essential to a healthy economy. However, the pres-
ence of the public safety net-uniquely available to a particular class of insti-
tutions-also implies that those institutions have unique public
responsibilities and may therefore be subject to implicit codes of conduct or
explicit regulations that do not fall on other institutions.
Id.
204. See Litan, supra note 172, at 11 ("The first and most important motivation for
bank regulation has been to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking and mon-
etary system.").
205. See Douglas, supra note 193, at 17.
For many years, deposit insurance could properly be characterized as an un-
qualified success. From 1934 until 1939, bank failures averaged only sixty
per year, at a total cost to the FDIC of only $18 million. From 1940 through
1980, bank and thrift failures were rare. Bank failures averaged less than
seven per year, at an average cost to the FDIC of less than $4 million per
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positors now have little to fear from bank failure;20 6 since the incep-
tion of federal deposit insurance there have been "few instances of
actual losses to depositors. '2 7 As a result, deposit insurance has also
been successful in preventing depositor runs. Even during the worst
period of bank and thrift failures in the late 1980s there were few bank
runs. 20  Furthermore, the FDIC has been a financial success. From
1933 to 1982, the FDIC's income from deposit insurance assessments
and investment income surpassed its insurance losses and administra-
tive and other expenses.2 0 9 By the end of 1948, the FDIC was able to
repay fully the government's initial funding of $289 million.21 0
C. The Crisis of the 1980s
In the late 1980s, another nationwide series of bank failures
threatened the success of the FDIC. Between 1987 and 1989, banks
failed at a rate of 200 per year.211 During the same years, 354 banks
reported losses every year.212 Not since the Great Depression had the
nation faced as grievous a banking disaster. These failures proved
that the banking system was not immune from instability and needed
further reform.
The crisis was attributable to a number of factors, but one cause in
particular stood out in the public eye-director mismanagement.
Amid reports that bank directors were fraudulently enriching them-
selves while driving their institutions to failure, the public reacted with
great hostility toward bank directors.213 The public hostility was not
without foundation. Director mismanagement clearly exacerbated the
crises.21 4 One study of 184 failed banks and twenty-six failed thrifts
"revealed that, in virtually every case, there had been a breach of fidu-
ciary duty and a breakdown in managerial competence and
responsibility. ''215
year. The income from premiums and investments exceeded expenditures
for bank failures in every year from 1935 through 1987.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
206. See Isaac, supra note 193, at 200 (noting that the deposit insurance system has
been able to "protect depositors of modest means from the consequences of bank
failure").
207. Treasury Study, supra note 170, at 4.
208. IL
209. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 62-63.
210. Id. at 58.
211. Brett D. Fromson, Will the FDIC Run Out of Money?, Fortune, Oct. 8, 1990, at
119, 120.
212. Id. at 119.
213. David B. Fischer, Comment, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New
Defense for Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions-or a Tighter
Noose?, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1744-46 (1992).
214. Sarah J. Hughes, Banking and Deposit Insurance: An Unfinished Agenda for
the 1990s, 68 Ind. L.J. 835, 837 (1993).
215. Fischer, supra note 213, at 1744.
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The crisis also resulted in a sudden realization that the insurance
fund was not inexhaustible. During the 1980s,
700 commercial banks with aggregate assets of almost $170 billion
failed or required assistance. The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund
for commercial banks, which stood at an historic high at the end of
1987, had essentially exhausted its net worth by the end of the dec-
ade. Similarly, in handling 600 thrift failures between 1980 and
1988, the Federal Savings and Insurance Corporation [sic] overspent
its resources by almost $60 billion.216
The Treasury Department, in its 1991 study, concluded that "the over-
extension of deposit insurance, result[ed] in excessive exposure for tax-
payers. '217 The realization that the insurance fund was not a golden
goose and that the taxpayer could be forced to bear the burden of
bank failures, combined with public hostility toward bank directors,
resulted in a desire to make those who contribute to a particular
bank's failure help pay the costs of that failure. To prevent taxpayer
exposure and to protect the insurance fund, Congress enacted FIR-
REA, and included in it § 1821(k), the director and officer liability
clause.
IH. SEcION 1821(K) AND THE CASE FOR SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE
Congress expressly intended FIRREA to "strengthen the enforce-
ment powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions"218 and
"to strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding
or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their deposi-
tors. 219 Congress sought to further both these functions through the
enactment of § 1821(k). Section 1821(k) is based on the premise that
when bank directors cause their institutions to fail or lose significant
amounts of money, those directors should be held personally liable.
Thus, it maximizes the government's ability to recover lost funds and
to hold directors accountable for their mismanagement."
216. Douglas, supra note 193, at 17.
217. Treasury Study, supra note 170, at ix. The Report argued that the banking
crisis was due to a "four-part" problem:
(1) reduced bank competitiveness and financial strength, caused by outdated
legal restrictions that have prevented banking organizations from respond-
ing to the evolution of financial markets and technology; (2) the overexten-
sion of deposit insurance, resulting in excessive exposure for taxpayers and
weakened market discipline for banks; (3) a fragmented regulatory system
that has created duplicative rules and has often failed to produce decisive
remedial action; and (4) an undercapitalized deposit insurance find.
Id.
218. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 101(9), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note
(Supp. V 1993)) (Purposes of 1989 Amendment).
219. FDIC v. Burrell, 779 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
220. FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 & n.21 (M.D. La. 1992).
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As originally proposed, § 1821(k) would have allowed the FDIC to
pursue directors for "any cause of action available at common law,
including, but not limited to, negligence, gross negligence, willful mis-
conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, conversion,
fraud, waste of corporate assets, and violations of statutes. '221 Be-
cause of the need to ensure that financial institutions are able to at-
tract capable individuals as directors,2 22 however, Congress lowered
the standard to gross negligence. In so doing, Congress undermined
both the explicit purposes of FIRREA and the historical rationales
underlying the regulatory powers of the FDIC and gave the FDIC a
blunted weapon.
A. The Case for Simple Negligence
Congress' decision to lower the standard in § 1821(k) to gross negli-
gence is flawed for several reasons. First, Congress gave excessive
weight to the need to attract qualified directors. Second, the gross
negligence standard forces the FDIC to bear the cost of negligent di-
rector mismanagement, thereby increasing the risk to the insurance
fund and to taxpayers.
1. Attracting Qualified Directors
The only justification given by Congress for lowering the standard
in § 1821(k) was the need for banks to be able to attract qualified
directors. Congress, along with those courts holding that § 1821(k)
preempts simple negligence claims, assume that if it were possible to
sue officers and directors under a simple negligence standard, banks
would not be able to attract qualified directors. 2
While all agree that it is in the public interest for banks to have
competent people serving as directors,' 4 there appears to be little, if
any, factual support for a theory that a mass exodus of directors will
occur on the implementation of a simple negligence standard. Cer-
tainly Congress, in its debate over § 1821(k), considered no such evi-
dence.2  Moreover, there is apparently no data that banks in states
221. S. 774, § 214(n), at 105, 106 11.3-4, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Calendar No. 45,
April 13, 1989) (emphasis added).
222. 135 Cong. Rec. S4264 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
223. Canfield III, 967 F.2d 443, 452 (10th Cir.) (Brorby, J., dissenting), cert. dis-
missed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992). The dissent argues that under a negligence standard,
"no reasonable attorney would advise his client to accept, and no reasonable person
would accept an offer to become a bank officer or director," because the "risk is just
too great. By its very nature, the lending business is risky. Bank officers and direc-
tors are responsible for managing that risk; however, it is not possible to do so in a
manner that results in no losses or only in losses that will be found in retrospect to
have been unavoidable." Id. at 451-52 (footnote omitted).
224. Canfield I, 763 F. Supp. 533, 539 (D. Utah 1991), rev'd en banc, 967 F.2d 443
(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
225. See Jon Shepherd, Note, The Liability of Officers and Directors Under the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 90 Mich. L. Rev.
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with a simple negligence standard have any more trouble attracting
directors than those in states with a gross negligence or intentional
tort standard. There is also no evidence that bank directors fled their
positions en masse following the enactment of § 1821(k) as it now
stands-despite the fact that in many states the gross negligence stan-
dard currently in § 1821(k) exposes directors to greater liability.
Further, Congress did not explain why simple negligence would cre-
ate insurmountable barriers to attracting directors whereas gross neg-
ligence would not. Although Congress "balanced" the need to attract
qualified directors with the need to hold directors liable for misman-
agement resulting in bank failure, Congress gave no indication why
gross negligence is the proper balance. Senator Riegle, one of FIR-
REA's floor managers, did note that, "[u]nlike other corporations,
when a bank officer or director is guilty of gross negligence, it will
often be the Federal taxpayer who is harmed. It would therefore ap-
pear to be justifiable to authorize the FDIC to seek to collect some of
those funds from the guilty parties."'2 6 No senator noted, however,
why the federal taxpayer would not be harmed, or why it would not
appear to be justifiable to authorize the FDIC to seek to collect some
of the lost funds, when a bank officer or director is guilty of simple
negligence.
In addition, Congress ignored the possibility that, instead of deter-
ring competent directors, a simple negligence standard may in fact
"appropriately deter those people who lack the requisite qualifica-
tions or expertise from becoming directors of financial institutions.' '22
In light of one study revealing that only eleven percent of those indi-
viduals nominated as bank directors in Georgia during the period
from 1983 to 1988 had previous experience as bankers or directors of
financial institutions, such a result may well be beneficial to the stabil-
ity of the banking system. 2 8
Furthermore, the promise of large salaries earned by bank officers
and directors, especially in large banks, rebuts the argument that large
banks will not be able to attract directors under a simple negligence
standard. For example, the chairman of the board of Citicorp was
paid a salary of $1,150,000 in 1993, as well as a bonus of $3,000,000,
1119, 1141 (1992) (explaining that "no one has shown any pattern of adverse effects
on the number of persons accepting offers to become officers or directors of financial
institutions in those states that allowed negligence actions against the officers and
directors of financial institutions before the enactment of FIRREA"). But see Laurie
Baum & John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. Wk., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 (re-
counting 10 incidents of mass resignations of outside directors).
226. 135 Cong. Rec. §§ 4278-79 (April 19, 1989).
227. Shepard, supra note 225, at 1141.
228. Robert F. Cook & Stanley H. Pollock, Bank Directors: Understanding Their
Role Responsibility and Liability, 40 Mercer L. Rev. 587, 588 n.5 (1989).
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not including stock options and other compensation. a9 Citicorp's Se-
nior Executive Vice President, on the other hand, made a salary of
$437,500, with a bonus of $875,000, also not including stock options.,-,
There can be little doubt that large banks paying these salaries will be
able to attract qualified directors.
Admittedly, smaller banks in smaller towns cannot afford to pay the
same salaries as large banks. Furthermore, small town banks have a
more limited pool of candidates from which to select their officers and
directors. Arguably, such banks would not be able to attract directors
under a simple negligence standard and, therefore, may not be able to
compete with larger banks who can attract directors. If smaller banks
are forced out of business by a simple negligence standard, that end
result may be for the best. Smaller banks cannot offer the economies
of scale available to larger banks.23' Small banks, especially in rela-
tively small towns, also have a more difficult time decreasing risk
through asset diversification and, therefore, are less likely to be safe
and sound.z32 This risk in turn may threaten the stability of the na-
tion's banking system. 3 Nevertheless, even smaller banks have the
option of acquiring director and officer liability insurance ("D&O in-
surance"). If D&O insurance is too expensive, all state-chartered
banks have the option of declining federal deposit insurance alto-
gether, thus removing the simple negligence standard, and ensuring
that any possible negligence on the part of bank directors will not be
passed on to the taxpayer."s
229. Citicorp, Notice of 1994 Annual Meeting of Stockholders & Proxy Statement
18 (1994).
230. Id
231. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1083, 1098 (1992).
232. Idt at 1102-03.
233. Idt at 1105.
234. While the idea of dropping federal insurance may seem unrealistic, at least one
article has contemplated the possibility of "uninsured depository facilities" as an al-
ternative to the costs of banking industry regulation-such as high director liability
standards. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, in their article Toward En-
hanced Consumer Choice in Banking: Uninsured Deposit Facilities as Financial In-
termediaries for the 1990's, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 865, 867 (1992), argue that given
the burdens of the regulatory system, the establishment of uninsured depository facili-
ties or, as labeled by the authors, consumer choice banks, is a viable alternative:
A consumer choice bank, as we envision it, is simply a bank chartered and
regulated at the state level which is not insured by the FDIC or subject to
most of the existing forms of federal bank regulation. Such a bank would be
able to operate at lower costs, and with greater efficiency and more flexibil-
ity, than existing commercial banks or thrift institutions. For this reason, it
would be able to pay higher interest on deposits than banks which are feder-
ally regulated and insured. The consumer choice bank would thus be capa-
ble of competing with nonbank financial institutions on a more level playing
field.
In addition to evening the playing field on which banks and nonbanks now
compete, and providing consumers with an option currently unavailable to
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Finally, it is illogical to insist that a simple negligence standard will
make it difficult to attract directors when such a standard is applied in
countless other situations. For example, a lawyer who negligently rep-
resents a client may be sued by that client for simple negligence. A
doctor who negligently treats a patient may be sued for simple negli-
gence. A driver who negligently injures a bystander may also be sued
for simple negligence. Despite this "high" standard of personal liabil-
ity in other areas of the law, many competent people seek to enter the
medical and legal professions and to exercise their privilege to drive
an automobile. 35 Moreover, neither the client, patient, or bystander
is a governmental entity ultimately supported by the taxpayer. Per-
haps the FDIC deserves the benefit of a negligence standard just as
much as the individual patient, especially considering the fact that the
taxpayer may ultimately have to pay for the bank director's
negligence.
Even if the adoption of a simple negligence standard would make it
difficult for banks to attract directors, there are stronger counter-
vailing considerations that outweigh this concern.
2. Protecting the Taxpayer and Making the Director Pay
The primary countervailing consideration is that by preventing the
FDIC from holding directors liable for simple negligence, Congress
has forced the FDIC to suffer the consequences of a director's negli-
gence. Consider, for example, a situation where a director has negli-
gently permitted her bank to make risky loans, thereby ultimately
contributing to the bank's failure. The FDIC sues under § 1821(k) for
gross negligence and loses. If the FDIC cannot find a purchaser for
the bank's assets, it must guarantee insured deposits and the insurance
fund must absorb this expense. Thus, the FDIC pays the cost of the
director's negligence. Moreover, forcing the insurance fund to absorb
the cost of the director's negligence contravenes one of the most ir-
them, the consumer choice bank offers additional advantages in terms of
regulatory flexibility and capital formation. Because deposits in consumer
choice banks would not be insured, the federal government's interest in reg-
ulating these banks would be much smaller than its interest in regulating
traditional insured banks. Consumer choice banks could be allowed to take
on levels of risk, or experiment with activities, that would be unacceptable
for banks operating under federal deposit insurance, even under the forth-
coming system of risk-adjusted premiums. Consumer choice banks could
thus fill market niches that are inadequately served by existing depository
institutions, and could act as innovators in the development of new banking
products or services that, if successful, might be allowed for depository insti-
tutions operating under federal deposit insurance.
Id. at 867-68.
235. But cf. Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal In-
jury: Further Reflections, 30 San Diego L Rev. 333, 333-34 (1993) (detailing the
"widespread concern" over the current tort system's legal, social, and economic costs
and suggesting possible reforms).
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portant goals of granting the FDIC enforcement authority-protect-
ing the insurance fund. Most importantly, however, should the
FDIC's insurance fund fail, as did that of the FSLIC,236 the taxpayer
would ultimately be forced to pay for the director's negligence.
" '[N]othing could be more paradoxical or contrary to sound policy
than to hold that it is the public which must bear.., a risk that would
never have been created but for defendant's wrong-doing in the first
instance.' "I'
3. The Stability of the System
Beyond taxpayer exposure, the gross negligence standard can
threaten the stability of the banking system, even if the insurance fund
remains healthy. To understand why, it is first necessary to describe
the current state of commercial banking.
Although banks still serve the dual functions of accepting deposits
and making loans,238 recent market innovations have allowed other
financial intermediaries to produce services that are close substitutes
for these essential bank services.239 Yet banks perform other essen-
tial, unique functions. The first and most important distinguishing
characteristic of banks is that they issue transaction accounts; "that is,
they incur liabilities payable on demand at par and are readily trans-
ferable by the owner to third parties."240 A checking account is an
example of a transaction account. Through a checking account, an
individual or a business is able to deposit earnings and pay bills-to
transact business. Through transaction accounts, banks create a safe
payment system by which individuals and businesses are able to make
and receive payments. Thus, even where a bank does not directly pro-
vide funding in a given situation, it still provides the payment mecha-
nism by which others do business.
236. See Douglas, supra note 193, at 12 (noting that the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), which was "abolished by Congress in 1989, left
behind massive liabilities measured in the tens of billions of dollars as a result of the
thrift failures which occurred through 1988"); 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 899(May 28, 1990) (estimating FSLIC's deficit at $56.7 billion) (footnote omitted).
237. FDIC v. White, 828 F. Supp. 304, 308 (D.N.J. 1993) (citation omitted).
238. See supra notes 169-79 and accompanying text.
239. See Corrigan, supra note 203, at 5 (noting that "there are numerous instances
in which nonbanks have been able to provide 'bank-like' services at a lower cost (or a
higher rate of return) to the individual or corporate customer"); Treasury Study,
supra note 170, at 6.
240. Corrigan, supra note 203, at 7.
The owner of a transaction account can demand and receive currency in the
face amount deposited in the account; write a check in the full amount of the
account; or, perhaps most importantly, the owner of the account can transfer
the full amount of the account to a third party .... The liquidity, mobility,
and acceptability of bank issued transaction accounts permit our diverse eco-
nomic and financial system to work with the relative ease and efficiency to
which we are accustomed.
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Second, "banks [remain] the primary source of liquidity for all other
classes and sizes of institutions, both financial and nonfinancial."'" In
other words, banks still make loans. Banks also issue contingent
credit obligations such as loan commitments and standby letters of
credit, which are equally important to the nation's economy2 42
Whether directly supplying money in the form of a loan or providing a
guarantee in the form of a loan commitment, banks provide direct and
standby sources of credit and liquidity central to the efficient function-
ing of the economy.
Because banks provide these functions, they are still subject to the
same systemic liquidity crisis as they were in the 1930s. Because a
bank's primary assets are still liquid, and its primary liabilities are still
highly illiquid, banks today remain inherently susceptible to depositor
runs.'- s Furthermore, because banks today still serve unique func-
tions, when a bank encounters problems or fails, the rest of the bank-
ing system must fill the void left by the problem bank in the backup
credit system. Therefore, the failure of a bank still has a far reaching
effect on the liquidity of the banking system as a whole. Professor
Helen Garten explained the systemic effects of a bank failure in to-
day's economy.
[T]he most significant cost associated with bank failures is not their
impact on the individual bank's own customers or community, but
their broader effect on the liquidity of the banking system as a
whole....
• .. [D]efault by a bank results in a net loss of a source of liquid-
ity for which no alternative exists except other banks. These remain-
ing banks must themselves weather the sudden increased demand
for liquidity either by liquidating assets or by selling new deposits.
Since the only way to stem the domino effect of credit withdrawal
caused by any business failure is to have at least some firms that
remain ready and willing to provide liquidity, it is essential that
241. Id. at 9; cf. 1 Malloy, supra note 2, at 1.10 fig. 1.1 (indicating that banks have
the single largest share of total private financial assets of all financial intermediaries).
242. Corrigan, supra note 203, at 9-10.
These standby credit facilities are, for example, the arrangements which per-
mit most financial markets and institutions to function as they do. It is
highly unlikely that the commercial paper market would function very well
were it not for the presence of standby bank credit facilities obtained by
those corporations that issue commercial paper. Similarly, it is very difficult
to imagine that even the best managed and capitalized broker/dealers could
handle their day-to-day business with the efficiency that is now so common
without ready access to bank lines of credit. The same, of course, applies to
nonfinancial corporations. Indeed, while all such institutions may, over
time, have access to a wide variety of funding sources, direct or standby bank
credit facilities are the cornerstone upon which these alternative sources of
credit rest ...
iT]he direct and standby credit facilities provided by banks are the foun-
dation upon which other credit markets depend for their vitality.
Id.
243. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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these sources of funding be secured. Although the repercussions of
individual bank failure can be tolerated if a sufficient number of
healthy banks remain in operation, as the liquidity crisis spreads,
each successive failure puts additional strain on the rest of the bank-
ing system.244
Because a systemic liquidity crisis is a constant and serious threat fac-
ing the banking system, it is important to note how that system may be
affected by § 1821(k).
Under the gross negligence standard in § 1821(k), the insurance
fund, not the negligent director, bears the costs of a director's simple
negligence. The insurance fund, however, must be kept at a statuto-
rily defined minimum percentage of the total amount of insured de-
posits. 245 Therefore, when the failure of a bank partially depletes the
fund, the cost of restoring the fund to its statutory minimum amount
must be passed on somehow. If a bank fails due to directorial negli-
gence, and the FDIC cannot find a purchaser for the bank's assets, the
FDIC may ultimately be forced to pass on the cost in the form of
higher premiums for federal deposit insurance.
Higher deposit insurance premiums may cause one of two results.
First, the banks may pass the cost of the higher premiums on to the
consumer. This, however, may reduce bank competitiveness, causing
banks to lose even more customers to nonbank competitors. When a
bank loses a customer to a nonbank competitor, an important source
of liquidity-that customer's deposits-is lost to the bank and the
banking industry. Second, if a bank cannot afford to pass the premi-
ums on to consumers for fear of losing customers, the bank must pay
244. Garten, supra note 175, at 161-62. Garten also discusses why the failure of a
general corporation does not have the same effect on liquidity:
If a corporation defaults on its bond payments, the bondholders have been
deprived of access to their funds to the same extent as depositors in a failed
bank. Nevertheless, even if this default has raised questions about the
creditworthiness of every other corporate borrower, alternative sources of
funds, such as bank deposits, have not been eliminated either for bondhold-
ers in need of cash or other corporate issuers temporarily unable to raise
funds in the debt markets. Even if some bondholders default on payments
to their own creditors, precipitating further failures, so long as banks remain
as back-up sources of liquidity, a financial panic can be contained.
Id. at 161.
245. The FDIC must maintain a "designated reserve ratio" currently set at 1.25%
of estimated insured deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(A)(I), (iv)(I) (Supp. V 1993).
The reserve ratio, however, may bet set at "a higher percentage of estimated insured
deposits [if] the Board of Directors determines [it] to be justified for that year by
circumstances raising a significant risk of substantial future losses to the fund." 12
U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(A)(iv)(II). If the reserve ratio falls below the designated reserve
ratio, the FDIC is authorized to "set semiannual assessment rates.., that are suffi-
cient to increase the reserve ratio.., to the designated reserve ratio not later than 1
year after such rates are set." 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(A). See also History of the
FDIC, supra note 24, at 61 (noting that mandatory adjustments to the assessment rate
must be made "if the ratio of the deposit insurance fund to estimated 'insured' depos-
its were to exceed 1.40 percent or were less than 1.10 percent").
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the higher premium out of its own assets, again resulting in a loss of
liquidity which could have been applied toward more profitable
investments.
In either case, higher premiums result in a loss of liquidity to the
individual banks and, therefore, to the banking system. This puts an
unnecessary strain on the banking system. The system must absorb
not only the loss of liquidity caused by the bank failure, but also the
additional loss of liquidity caused by the higher premiums. In light of
the need for stability in the banking system, evidenced by the banking
crises in the 1930s and 1980s, this result is both dangerous and
unnecessary.
There is no evidence that a simple negligence standard will make it
impossible for banks to attract directors? 1 ' On the other hand, it is
intuitively correct jnd just for directors to be held accountable for
their negligent management of a bank; indeed, this is one of the pur-
poses of § 1821(k). The alternative-requiring the FDIC to bear the
cost of a director's simple negligence-exposes taxpayers to financial
liability, threatens the liquidity of the banking system, and prevents
the FDIC from "using every legal means available to conserve FDIC
financial resources."" 7 For these reasons, the FDIC should be al-
lowed to hold bank directors liable under a standard of simple
negligence.
B. Applying a Simple Negligence Standard
There are two ways to ensure that the FDIC will be allowed to bring
simple negligence causes of actions against bank directors. The first
would be for the Supreme Court to dispose of the issues surrounding
§ 1821(k) in favor of simple negligence claims. Judicial interpretation
of § 1821(k) does not, however, suffice for two reasons. First, because
relatively few states have simple negligence standards for directors, a
holding that § 1821(k) does not preempt state laws with a lower, sim-
ple negligence standard of liability would be of limited assistance to
the FDIC in its attempts to maintain the insurance fund.2 8 Second,
following the Supreme Court's decision in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC,-9 it is unlikely that the Court would allow the FDIC to bring
federal common law claims of simple negligence against bank direc-
tors. In O'Melveny & Myers, the Court held that there is no federal
common law under FIRREA150 and declined to adopt "a court-made
246. See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
247. History of the FDIC, supra note 24, at 57.
248. See Schipani, supra note 30, at 744 (noting that "over forty states have enacted
legislation either insulating or permitting corporations to insulate certain governance
officials from acts of simple negigence" and that "[m]any states also provide exculpa-
tion for acts of gross negligence").
249. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
250. Id. at 2052-53.
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rule to supplement federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive
and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presuma-
bly left subject to the disposition provided by state law."'251 Because
the Supreme Court in O'Melveny & Myers found that FIRREA was
comprehensive and detailed, it is almost beyond doubt that the
Supreme Court would find that bank director liability is not one of
those "extraordinary cases" that would warrant use of federal com-
mon law.252
The second method to ensure that the FDIC will be able to bring
suits against bank directors based on simple negligence is a congres-
sional revision of § 1821(k). Because of the limited effect of a
Supreme Court disposition, Congress should raise the standard of lia-
bility in § 1821(k) to simple negligence. Changing the law, however, is
not as simple as inserting "simple" in the place of "gross" in § 1821(k)
and otherwise leaving the current provision as is. The split of judicial
authority, previously discussed, demonstrates the need to redraft the
section entirely.
1. Uniformity
The present § 1821(k) defines the standard of conduct according to
state law. As many of the courts finding that § 1821(k) preempts state
law noted, however, public policy supports a national, uniform stan-
dard of liability" 3 to "replace an increasingly confusing body of state
law." '254 Defining the standard of conduct by state law is problematic
because different states have different definitions of standards of con-
duct?. 55 Allowing culpable conduct to be defined by state law causes
director liability to turn, not on the significance of the misconduct, but
instead on the location of the federally insured bank. As the Canfield
I court noted: "Surely one of the goals of this legislation was to make
liability dependent upon culpable conduct rather than state of resi-
dence."' 6 To make liability truly dependent on culpability instead of
state of residence, the simple negligence standard must be defined ac-
cording to federal law.
A national standard of bank director liability also promotes effi-
ciency in prosecuting directors of failed, federally insured banks.
Forcing regulators to learn different state law definitions means more
time, legal research, and cost borne by the regulators. The administra-
tive and legal costs of pursuing directors of failed institutions is tre-
251. Id. at 2054.
252. See id. at 2056.
253. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
254. Canfield I, 763 F. Supp. 533, 540 (D. Utah 1991), rev'd en banc, 967 F.2d 443(10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
255. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
256. Canfield 1, 763 F. Supp. at 540.
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mendous. 57 Definition of the standard of liability by reference to
state law increases this cost. On the other hand, defining the standard
under federal law "establishes the parameters of liability for the bene-
fit of officers and directors and the FDIC. Everyone now knows
where they stand."'  A national standard of liability, defined by fed-
eral common law, will allow both the regulators' time and effort and
the taxpayers' dollars to be focused on pursuing culpable parties, not
on deciphering state law definitions.-5 9 Such a standard allows greater
efficiency for regulators than if they are "forced to wind [their] way
through the morass of state legislation engulfing the issue of director
and officer liability. Uniformity saves money, time and manpower. In
the midst of the financial institution crisis facing this nation these are
goals worthy of serious consideration."'
2. The Business Judgment Rule
There is an additional reason for defining the negligence standard
through federal law. Absent federal statutory law governing bank di-
rector liability and fully preempting state law, application of a state's
business judgment rule could defeat a simple negligence standard. In
the context of director liability, most states apply the business judg-
ment rule, "a doctrine limiting the liability of a director."'' 1 Beyond
such a general description it is hard to define the rule, however, be-
cause of a "lack of consensus ... as to what the rule really is. ' '2 1
Some courts have held that the business judgment rule has the ef-
fect of raising the standard of liability for directors to gross negli-
gence. For example, both the courts in FDIC v. Mintz' and RTC v.
Gibson264 held that the gross negligence standard in the current
§ 1821(k) does not preempt state law claims based on simple negli-
gence. Both courts went on to conclude, however, that the business
judgment rule effectively lowered the standard of liability for directors
to gross negligence and, therefore, the business judgment rule barred
the FDIC from pursuing its simple negligence claims.2  Obviously
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. 1l
260. Id.
261. Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project. Of the Duty of Due
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41 Bus. Law. 1237, 1240 (1986).
262. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287, 287-88 (1994).
263. 816 F. Supp. 1541 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
264. 829 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1993).
265. See MintZ, 816 F. Supp. at 1546 ("The result of the application of the business
judgment rule in Florida is that the standard of liability for corporate directors is
'gross negligence.' "); Gibson, 829 F. Supp. at 1117 ("This court believes that the Mis-
souri business judgment rule provides shelter for conduct equivalent to what the par-
ties have referred to as 'simple negligence.'... [T]he Missouri business judgment rule
bars claims for simple negligence.").
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this application of the business judgment rule disembowels any simple
negligence standard and is paramount to lowering that standard to
gross negligence.
Other courts have held that the business judgment rule imposes a
good faith standard. Therefore, "as long as a director acts in good
faith and with due care in the process sense, the director will not be
found liable even though the [business] decision itself was not that of
the 'ordinarily prudent person.' ",266 Here the question is not whether
the director was negligent or grossly negligence, but whether she acted
in bad faith.
Finally, some courts have held that the business judgment rule is
simply a rebuttable presumption that a director's actions are "within
the powers of the corporation (intra vires) and the authority of man-
agement, and involve[] the exercise of due care and compliance with
applicable fiduciary duties."2 67 Courts applying this version of the
business judgment rule often state that the rule " 'does not conflict
with the concept of negligence' ,26 because the rule simply presup-
poses that reasonable diligence has been exercised. This version of
the business judgment rule poses the least threat to a simple negli-
gence standard because it is merely a tautology:
Stating that directors will be immune from liability so long as they
act with due care (or reasonable diligence) and comply with their
fiduciary duties (that is, are disinterested and act in good faith) is
simply saying that directors will not be liable for their decisions un-
less there is a reason for holding them liable.269
In other words, directors will not be held liable unless they are
negligent.
The lack of consensus on the definition of the business judgment
rule demonstrates that courts should not apply the business judgment
rule to actions brought under § 1821(k). Allowing courts to apply dif-
fering versions of the business judgment rule undermines the rationale
behind a uniform standard of liability. Allowing directors to hide be-
hind the differing state definitions of the business judgment rule
makes liability dependent, not on culpable conduct, but on state of
residence. Furthermore, forcing regulators to learn different state law
definitions of the business judgment rule increases the time, effort,
and cost of pursuing bank directors. Finally, states applying the "gross
negligence" definition of the business judgment rule effectively ban
suits brought by the FDIC under simple negligence. Defining the neg-
266. Hansen, supra note 261, at 1240.
267. Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 242 (3d ed.
1983).
268. RTC v. Heiserman, 839 F. Supp. 1457, 1464 (D. Colo. 1993) (quoting Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1040 (1986)).
269. Gevurtz, supra note 262, at 290-91.
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ligence standard under federal law, without applying the business
judgment rule, would avoid these results.
Because the business judgment rule is an established element of
corporate law,270 however, it is important to illustrate why, even were
the business judgment rule defined by federal law, it should not be
applied to suits brought by the FDIC under § 1821(k). The business
judgment rule should not be applied because none of the rationales
supporting application of the rule apply to actions by the FDIC
against bank directors.
There are three main policy grounds advanced for the application of
the business judgment rule:
a. If management were liable for mere good faith errors in judg-
ment, few capable individuals would be willing to incur the financial
and emotional risk of serving as a director or officer. Competent
persons should be encouraged rather than deterred from seeking to
serve as corporate managers.
b. Courts are generally ill-equipped to evaluate business judgments
or to second guess the validity of a business decision.
c. Corporate managers should be encouraged to efficiently manage
the corporation by taking reasonable risks and by being allowed
wide discretion in the handling of corporate affairs. 271
The first rationale, the availability of applicants, has been discussed
above.27 The argument that courts are "ill-equipped to evaluate busi-
ness judgments or to second guess the validity of a business deci-
sion"273 raises an issue that seemingly collapses under its own weight.
If fact finders are not equipped to evaluate business judgments, how
can they be equipped to evaluate other tort claims for negligence or,
for that matter, any of the numerous and complex issues that courts
daily undertake? In this respect, making a business decision is indis-
tinguishable from making a medical decision or a decision as to the
safe speed for an automobile. Judges and juries are not business ex-
perts, yet neither are they medical or traffic experts. If courts can
evaluate the decision to perform or not to perform a specific medical
procedure, the intent behind an allegedly criminal act, or the allegedly
negligent decision of a driver to drive at a certain speed, certainly a
court can evaluate the reasonableness of a business decision. Business
decisions do not represent a distinct and impenetrable field rendering
them particularly inappropriate for judicial review. On the contrary,
business decisions are quite similar to decisions by other profession-
als.2 74 In fact, "there is nothing about business decisions which makes
270. 1L at 287 (noting that "the rule, in one form or another, extends back through
160 years of judicial decisions").
271. Granada Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 454-55 (NiD.
Ohio 1993).
272. See supra notes 223-235 and accompanying text.
273. Granada Investments, 823 F. Supp. at 455.
274. Gervurtz, supra note 262, at 309.
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an after-the-fact judicial review of reasonableness inherently less ac-
curate than in other areas."2 75
Finally, courts urge that the business judgment rule is important be-
cause a corporate manager should be encouraged to manage a corpo-
ration efficiently by taking reasonable risks and by being allowed wide
discretion. 76 In Joy v. North,277 the Second Circuit described the
"risk encouraging" rationale for the business judgment rule in the fol-
lowing terms: "[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the po-
tential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law
not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions ...
Shareholders can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their
holdings. 2 7 1
The risk-taking rationale is problematic for two reasons. First, it is
far from clear why this rationale applies only to directors of corpora-
tions and not to others:
Overall, the concern that liability for ordinary negligence will deter
directors from taking worthwhile risks sounds remarkably like the
lament of doctors who complain that the threat of malpractice suits
has forced them to engage in "defensive medicine" with the result
of unnecessarily increased costs and the avoidance of worthwhile
but more risky medical treatments. Similar laments can be heard
coming from other professionals faced with liability for negligence.
The concern about director liability and risk taking may well be
valid. It is not, however, unique.279
Thus, while the risk-taking rationale may be a valid argument for tort
reform, it does not justify differentiating between corporate directors
and other potential tort defendants who make similar assertions for
more lenient treatment?80
Second, while a risk-taking rationale might make sense for a general
business corporation, it does not make sense for a bank. Because
275. Id. at 311. In addition, although courts repeatedly maintain that "judges are
not business experts," Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919), and,
therefore, courts will not substitute their business judgment for that of the corporate
director, they often do just that. As a classic example, in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), the Supreme Court of Michigan, after stating that it is not
"the duty of the courts to interfere" in business decisions, held that Henry Ford's
business decision not to declare special dividends, while not tainted with fraud, illegal-
ity, or even negligence, was an improper business decision. Id. at 684. In Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), the Supreme Court of Delaware an-
nounced that, in determining whether a motion to dismiss a derivative suit, made by
an independent committee set up by the corporation, should be granted, the court
"should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether the mo-
tion should be granted." Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Not only are courts qualified to
exercise review of business judgments, they often do.
276. Granada Investments, 823 F. Supp. at 455.
277. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
278. Id. at 886.
279. Gevurtz, supra note 262, at 312.
280. Id. at 289.
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banks serve essential economic functions, ' "[t]he first and most im-
portant motivation for bank regulation has been to ensure the safety
and soundness of the banking and monetary system." Because
banks provide liquidity for other institutions, it is essential that banks'
assets be sound.z 3 Thus, risk taking in the banking context is more
vulnerable to criticism because it may threaten the maintenance of a
strong national banking system.
The concern with limiting the risk-taking activities of banks is, in
fact, precisely the rationale behind the original divorce of investment
and commercial banking. Because "stock gambling" was seen as in-
herently risky, it was perceived to be a threat to the stability of the
banking system.3 Not only did Congress ban commercial banks
from participating in what it reasoned to be an inherently risky activ-
ity, but the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s forcefully demon-
strated the dangers of risk taking in the banking context.
The dangers of commercial banks engaging in risk-taking behavior
was aptly demonstrated by the banking crisis of the 1980s. The rash of
bank failures in the late 1980s "can be attributed in great measure to
the concentrations of risky assets in the banks' portfolios."'  By
making large, imprudent, and risky loans, most notably for real estate,
many savings and loan directors drove their institutions to ruin. These
"[p]oor thrift management decisions ... resulted in failure for hun-
dreds of FSLIC insured thrifts," 81 thereby threatening the stability of
the nation's banking system. While directors were not solely to blame
for the banking crises in the 1980s, the risk taking of many directors
contributed significantly to that crisis.
Finally, it must be noted that the FDIC is forced into the role of
receiver; "like a bankruptcy trustee and unlike a normal successor in
interest, [the FDIC] does not voluntarily step into the shoes of the
bank, it is thrust into those shoes."'' 7 The FDIC is, therefore, an "in-
voluntary stockholder," and cannot diversify its "holdings."
Due to the nature of banks and the banking system, courts should
not encourage bank directors to take risks to the same degree that
might be tolerable in a general business corporation. In the case of
281. See supra notes 238-244 and accompanying text.
282. Litan, supra note 172, at 11.
283. Corrigan, supra note 203, at 11 (noting that "the ability of banks to fulfill their
role as standby sources of liquidity and credit rests importantly on the quality and
consistency of credit judgments made by banks").
284. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
285. Douglas, supra note 193, at 11.
286. H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 95.
287. RTC v. Moskowitz, Civ. A. No. 93-2080, 1994 WL 229812, at *17 (D.NJ. May
24, 1994).
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banks, "the law [must] create incentives for overly cautious corporate
decisions." 2 s
In light of the foregoing considerations, Congress should redraft
§ 1821(k) to allow the FDIC to hold bank directors liable for simple
negligence. Further, this simple negligence standard should be de-
fined by federal law without the benefit of the business judgment
rule.289
C. Meanwhile... Back in the Courts
It is clear that until Congress redrafts § 1821(k), federal courts will
be faced with the preemption problem. Those courts faced with the
preemptive reach of § 1821(k) must concede that "Congress' choice of
language in 12 U.S.C. section 1821(k) is susceptible to two valid yet
opposing interpretations,' '29° and then face the real question: "Which
'correct' interpretation will the court adopt, and why?" 91 Courts
should not waste time composing treatises on the plain language and
legislative history of the section; they should instead focus on the pub-
lic policy rationales underlying that section. Moreover, the courts
should not limit themselves to the considerations of uniformity and
288. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
289. The resulting statute may resemble the following:
(k) Liability of directors and officers
(I) A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf of,
or at the request or direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted
wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from,
assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from,
assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an insured deposi-
tory institution or its affiliate in connection with assistance provided under
section 1823 of this title, for simple negligence, including any similar conduct
or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (than
simple negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined in paragraph (ii) of this section or as they are de-
fined and determined under applicable federal common law as developed by
the courts. In developing that law, the courts shall not apply the business
judgment rule, or any other similar rule limiting the Corporation's ability to
hold directors and officers personally liable for simple negligence. Nothing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under
other applicable state or federal law.
(ii) Simple negligence for the purposes of this section shall be defined as a
failure to act with the care which an ordinarily prudent person would exer-
cise under similar circumstances. Violation of this standard shall not be con-
strued to require bad faith, fraud, self-dealing, or a conflict of interest on the
part of the director charged with a violation under this section.
290. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.) (Brorby, J., dissenting), cert.
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
291. Id
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the attraction of qualified directors. Instead, courts should look to the
policy behind the regulation of banking in general as well as the policy
behind the FDIC and its regulatory and supervisory powers. Given
these policy considerations, courts must find that § 1821(k) does not
preempt simple negligence claims under either state law or federal
common law.
CONCLUSION
Section 1821(k) must be amended to contain a simple negligence
standard to hold directors liable for their negligence and to allow the
FDIC to protect the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayer, thereby
helping to maintain the stability of the banking system. If an automo-
bile driver "who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or distance
injuring a pedestrian will . . . be called upon to respond in dam-
ages,"' 92 and a doctor who makes a negligent mistake as to treatment
will be held liable to the injured patient, then a bank director or of-
ficer who negligently fails to investigate a potentially risky loan, or
fails reasonably to oversee bank operations, thereby causing the bank
to fail and threatening the stability of the banking system, must also
be held personally liable.293
292. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983).
293. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage
or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287, 336 (1994). In concluding that "corpo-
rate law would do well without" the business judgment rule, id at 337, Professor
Gevurtz writes:
The obstetrician dealing with a difficult labor, the trial lawyer planning
strategy, or just the automobile driver attempting a left turn into a busy thor-
oughfare must exercise judgment. So must we all. When this judgment re-
sults in harm to another, then the doctor, attorney, or driver can find him or
herself as the defendant in a suit based upon negligence. Perhaps this has
produced a system in which there is too much second guessing by those who
have the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight. Perhaps an unintended effect of
this Article will be to add to the debate over tort law reform. Be that as it
may, there is simply no call for treating business judgments by corporate
directors any differently than any other judgment.
Id. at 336.
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